Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T23:52:58.576Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

INTERSUBJECTIVE BELIEF

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2017

Vivienne Brown
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper proposes a new model of shared belief amongst individual subjects based on a new approach to theorising individual subjects in social context. In this approach, which I term the intersubjective approach, individual subjects are modelled in terms of the standpoint of each of us, thereby incorporating the phenomenological standpoint of an individual subject's inclusion of herself within the plurality, ‘us’ (a class in the distributive sense). This provides resources for a new model of shared belief, including common belief, in terms of intersubjective belief, which is an individual subject's belief that ‘each of us has the same belief that p’. The paper argues that the intersubjective model of shared belief provides a non-reductive alternative to the standard interactive model of mutual belief and common belief, and so provides a non-individualistic framework for analysing shared belief in social contexts. As an illustration, the intersubjective model of common belief is applied to the Hi-Lo game; the solution is (High, High).

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 139 - 156
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Aumann, R. J. 1976. ‘Agreeing to Disagree.’ Annals of Statistics, 4: 1236–9.Google Scholar
Aumann, R. J. 1999. ‘Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge.’ International Journal of Game Theory, 28: 263–300.Google Scholar
Braun, D. 2016. ‘Indexicals.’ In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/indexicals/.Google Scholar
Chwe, M. S.-Y. 2001. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ernst, Z. 2011. ‘What is Common Knowledge?’ Episteme, 8: 209–26.Google Scholar
Fagin, R., Halpern, J. Y., Moses, Y. and Vardi, M. Y. 2003. Reasoning About Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (First edition 1995.)Google Scholar
Friedell, M. F. 1969. ‘On the Structure of Shared Awareness.’ Behavioral Science, 14: 28–39. (Working Paper 27, Centre for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, April 1967.)Google Scholar
Kaplan, D. 1989. ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives, and Other Indexicals.’ In Almoog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds), Themes from Kaplan, pp. 481–563. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 2002. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (First published, 1969, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.)Google Scholar
Vanderschraaf, P. and Sillari, G. 2014. ‘Common Knowledge.’ In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/common-knowledge/.Google Scholar
Weirich, P. 2011. ‘Introduction: Interactive Epistemology.’ Episteme, 8: 201–8.Google Scholar