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IN DEFENSE OF SUBJECT-SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2015

Brian Kim
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Abstract

Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward third-person denials are inappropriate in the relevant cases. And while there are certain denials that are appropriate, they pose no problems for SSI. Next, I offer an explanation, compatible with SSI, of the oddity of now you know it, now you don't claims. To conclude, I discuss the intuitiveness of purism, whose rejection is the source of many problems for SSI. I propose to explain away the intuitiveness of purism as a side-effect of the narrow focus of previous epistemological inquiries.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 233 - 251
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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