Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T01:03:21.709Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Linda Zagzebski
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this paper I distinguish three degrees of epistemic egoism, each of which has an ethical analogue, and I argue that all three are incoherent. Since epistemic autonomy is frequently identified with one of these forms of epistemic egoism, it follows that epistemic autonomy as commonly understood is incoherent. I end with a brief discussion of the idea of moral autonomy and suggest that its component of epistemic autonomy in the realm of the moral is problematic.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , October 2007 , pp. 252 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Foley, Richard. 2001. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, Richard. 2005. “Universal Intellectual Trust.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(1): 5–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, Elizabeth. 2006. “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.” In Lackey, Jennifer and Sosa, Ernest (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, pp. 225–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar