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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2019

Elizabeth Jackson Open the ORCID record for Elizabeth Jackson [Opens in a new window]
Elizabeth Jackson*
Affiliation:
Australian National University and Ryerson University
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I show how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to the toggling objection. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously.

Keywords

DoubtEpistemic SupererogationEvidencePermissivismPragmatic EncroachmentRationalitySalienceUniqueness
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 313 - 327
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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