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The Competing Practices Argument and Self-Defeat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Todd Stewart
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Extract

Andy believes that p because his tarot cards indicate that p. Betty believes that ∼p because her crystal ball reveals that ∼p. If Andy and Betty know that they disagree, and disagree because they engage in different practices, is Andy's belief that p rational? The answer depends in part on whether Andy has good reasons to think that reading tarot cards is reliable about the topic while reading crystal balls is not. If a person has good reasons to believe that practice P1 is reliable while a competing practice P2 is not, then it is not irrational to form beliefs by engaging in P1. What if a person does not have good reasons to think that one practice is reliable about a topic while competing practices are not, though? In such cases, would Andy's awareness of the existence of competing practices, on its own, be enough to render his belief that p irrational?

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , June 2005 , pp. 13 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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