Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 May 2002
In the literature of contingent valuation, a rights-based system of environmental ethics claiming that natural objects have absolute rights, has frequently been regarded as the main reason for incommensurability, i.e. for citizens’ inability to find a common measure according to which all values could be ranked. In a study of 2400 Finns aged between 18 and 70, we tested whether a respondent's commitment to guaranteeing private property rights could be a reason for incommensurability beyond the respondent's possible commitment to absolute nature rights. It was found that incommensurability, modelled with lexicographic preferences, was attributable more often to private property rights than to nature rights. However, Finnish respondents who had lexicographic preferences for nature rights based their choice more often on an ethical judgement, whereas lexicographic preferences for property rights could rather be explained with an ambivalent preference construction. Lexicographic preferences for nature rights increased the willingness to pay for conservation, while lexicographic preferences for property rights decreased it. The result, which was predicted by the theory, supported the validity of incommensurability measurement. The study therefore indicates that several reasons for incommensurable preferences may exist and that it is possible to measure these reasons in contingent valuation surveys in order to judge the validity of the welfare measures in environmental policy decision-making.
To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.