This paper aims to consider the meaning of the dismal theorem, as presented by Martin Weitzman [(2009) On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics91, 1–19]. The theorem states that a standard cost–benefit analysis breaks down if there is a possibility of catastrophes occurring. This result has a significant influence on debates regarding the economics of climate change. In this study, we present an intuitive similarity between the dismal theorem and the St. Petersburg paradox using a simple discrete probability distribution.

This paper examines ethnic differences in fuelwood consumption in rural households, using an original survey dataset from two western Chinese provinces with large ethnic minority populations. We use a Heckman two-stage selection model to explain the quantity of fuelwood consumed conditional on a decision to use fuelwood. We find that ethnic minority families are more likely than majority Han Chinese families to use fuelwood. We also find that a household's off-farm income has a stronger negative effect on the quantity of fuelwood consumed for the ethnic minority families than for the Han Chinese families. In addition, families owning a larger area of forestland are more likely to use fuelwood. Yet the quantity of fuelwood consumed, especially in ethnic minority families, does not increase with owned forestland. Finally, we find that coal, rather than electricity, is a substitute for fuelwood for residential cooking and heating.

Drought events have critical impacts on agricultural production yet there is little consensus on how these should be measured and defined, with implications for drought research and policy. We develop a flexible rainfall-temperature drought index that captures all dry events and we classify these as Type 1 (above-average cooling degree days) and Type 2 droughts (below-average cooling degree days). Applied to a panel dataset of Indian districts over 1966–2009, Type 2 droughts are found to have negative marginal impacts comparable to those of Type 1 droughts. Irrigation more effectively reduces Type 2 drought-induced yield losses than Type 1 yield losses. Over time, Type 1 drought losses have declined while Type 2 losses have risen. Estimates of average yield losses due to Type 1 droughts are reduced by up to 27 per cent when Type 2 droughts are omitted. The associated ex-post economic costs in terms of rice production are underestimated by up to 124 per cent.

To guide investments in ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) in developing countries, numerous stated preference valuation studies have been implemented to assess the value of ecosystem services. These studies increasingly use time payments as an alternative to money. There is limited knowledge, however, about how to convert time to money and how the type of payment affects willingness to pay (WTP). In this study, the results of choice experiments using time and money payments are compared in the context of EbA measures in Vietnam. Six, of which five individual-specific, conversion rates are applied. WTP estimates are found to be higher for time payments. Moreover, the type of payment vehicle as well as the conversion rate has substantial effect on mean WTP and WTP distributions. We discuss implications of these results for the conversion of time to money and the use of resulting WTP estimates in cost benefit analyses in developing countries.

We examine relations between strategic environmental policy, international R&D cartels and research joint ventures (RJVs), using a third-country model with Cournot duopoly. We indicate that forming an R&D/RJV cartel reduces governments' incentives to extract rent from consumers in the third country. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that social welfare under R&D cartels with full information sharing, i.e., RJV cartels, cannot surpass that under R&D/RJV competition, whereas forming an R&D/RJV cartel works well for environmental investment. Among the policy implications, we show that governments can maximize global welfare by collectively determining whether to allow R&D/RJV cartels.