In response to the CITES ban on trade in elephant ivory, mammoth ivory began to be produced in post-Soviet Russia. We investigate how this substitute to elephant ivory has affected the poaching of elephants. We argue that the early success of the 1989 ivory ban at increasing the African elephant population was driven in part by increasing supply of mammoth ivory. The more recent increases in poaching appear to be driven by increasing demand and falling African institutional quality. We find that absent the 80 tonnes of Russian mammoth ivory exports per annum 2010–2012, elephant ivory prices would have doubled from their $ 100 per kilogram level and that the current poaching level of 34,000 elephants per year may have increased by as many as 55,000 elephants per year on a population of roughly half a million animals.

This article investigates whether residents of Mexico City value air quality. Our results suggest that air quality improvement in PM10 is equivalent to a marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) of US$440.31 per property for the period 2006–2013. The corresponding MWTP for PM2.5 is US$880.63, for O3 is US$623.78, and for SO2 is as much as US$2091.50. These estimates are considerably larger in magnitude compared to the few other studies in similar settings. As a percentage of annual household income, these represent 2.44 per cent for PM10, 4.88 per cent for PM2.5, 3.46 per cent for O3 and 11.59 per cent for SO2. Our estimates of land value–pollution elasticities for PM10 (−0.26 and − 0.58) are within range of hedonic estimates for total suspended particulate matter in US cities around the 1970s. The corresponding elasticities range from − 0.55 to − 0.84 for PM2.5, from − 0.06 to − 0.49 for O3 and from − 0.11 to − 0.34 for SO2.

Based on an unexplored data set on disasters in Brazil, the current study shows that the direct damage of natural disasters reduces the GDP growth rate of municipal economies in Ceará state, Northeast Brazil. The agriculture and service sectors are the most affected economic sectors, while the industrial sector remains unaffected by environmental shocks. Economic growth is particularly responsive to the occurrence of large natural disasters that lead municipalities to declare a state of emergency or public calamity. Regarding public policies, water supply infrastructure increases the resilience of the output growth of services to droughts, whereas disaster microinsurance helps to mitigate the effects of droughts and floods on the economic growth of agriculture in a Brazilian state where family farming is predominant and highly vulnerable to natural disasters.

We study entry policies as an alternative form of environmental policy. Given the strong political opposition to standard output subsidies and taxes, several countries have recently used entry policies to promote renewable energy technology, such as solar panels and biofuels. We study a two-stage game in which two regulators choose an entry policy (i.e., tax, subsidy or permit) to maximize domestic welfare. Observing the policy, firms decide the region in which to enter and compete as Cournot oligopolists. We find that both domestic (uncoordinated) policies and internationally coordinated policies increase welfare relative to unregulated settings. However, the welfare gains from international policy coordination are only large when the product is extremely clean. These results indicate that the welfare gains of international policy coordination may only offset the costs of negotiation in relatively clean industries.

We investigate the interaction between environmental quality and fertility in an altruistic bequest model with pollution externalities created by the aggregate production. Despite the negative externality related to the endogenous childbearing decisions, parents may choose to have fewer children in the competitive economy than in the social optimum. To achieve optimality, positive taxes on childbearing are required even with an insufficient number of children, if the social discount factor equals the parents' degree of altruism. On the other hand, child allowances may constitute the optimal policy if the social discount factor exceeds the parents' degree of altruism.