This paper studies the intergenerational welfare effects of climate change and a control policy within a decentralized overlapping generations framework, including endogenous abatement activities. The model incorporates a profit stimulated R&D with realistic market distortions to create an induced innovation structure. In this setting, a control policy has the dual role of discouraging emissions and triggering new abatement technologies. The results from numerical simulations show that the omission of entrepreneurial response to a control policy is likely to result in overestimation of costs associated with this particular policy. Although induced innovation has the potential to reduce the compliance costs with the control policy, current and near-future generations will bear some net costs. The higher the damage projected from climate change, the earlier the net benefit will arrive.

Pollution-reducing infrastructure is introduced in a general spatial equilibrium model of a monocentric city as a public good which serves to abate polluting emissions from households' consumption. This is an innovative extension to an urban economics model and motivated by stylized facts observed for the case of Bombay. It allows us to develop and analyse improved policy instruments to solve urban environmental problems.

We demonstrate how the optimal density of people, goods consumption, and pollution-reducing infrastructure are interrelated and spatially distributed. The public-good character of infrastructure is shown to favour an increased infrastructural density all over the city in response to increased population size. In two settings of public and private infrastructural supply, we derive three interrelated and spatially differentiated policy instruments, by which the optimal allocation is implemented as a spatial market equilibrium.

This paper aims to address the impact on deforestation of the use of forest products as safety nets by poor agricultural households. Two safety-net uses may be implemented: the diversification strategy and the coping strategy. With both strategies, crop risk reduction, lower risk aversion and larger population increase tropical deforestation. Forest profitability always tends to increase the forest cover in the diversification case. Conversely, considering the coping strategy, two opposite effects determine the impact of forest profitability on the forest cover: a portfolio effect and an insurance effect. Finally, the household is better off and deforests less when using the diversification strategy instead of the coping strategy.

The potential importance of natural resources for the livelihood of poor rural households has long been recognized but seldom quantified and analyzed. In this paper, we apply poverty and inequality measures to national and community level data sets to explore the impacts of resource extraction on rural welfare. Our findings suggest that natural resource extraction reduces both income inequality and poverty. Results from a simulation analysis at the community level indicate that poverty may be reduced, in the short-run, by increases in the price of a non-timber forest product.

Negative externalities in groundwater irrigation arise due to overdraft of groundwater leading to premature well failure, and reduced yield and age/life of wells. A watershed development program aiming at recharging aquifers, facilitating sustainable groundwater use, is the focus of this study. Primary survey data from farmers using groundwater for irrigation in a dry land watershed in peninsular India are analysed. Results indicate that, even after considering (i) amortized cost of watershed, (ii) amortized cost per acre-inch of groundwater, and (iii) electricity cost of groundwater extraction, the net returns in watershed are economically viable. This can aid policy-makers, addressing groundwater overdraft leading to negative externalities, reach solutions with the assistance of a watershed development program enhancing groundwater recharge in dryland areas in developing countries.

The pollution haven hypothesis maintains that the industries that are highly pollution intensive, i.e. dirty industries, have been migrating from developed economies to the developing world. It is argued that the environmental concerns of the developed economies caused them to enact strict environmental regulations, which have increased the cost of production of the dirty industries at home. On the other hand, the developing countries with their low wages and lax environmental regulations have been attractive alternative producers in these sectors. Thus, developing countries provide pollution havens for dirty industries. In this study, the pollution haven argument for Turkey, for the 1994–1997 period, is examined. The study focuses on the pollution haven hypothesis from the trade perspective by looking at the manufacturing industry data at four-digit ISIC detail by using the panel data approach. It is found that exports increase as the dirtiness of the industries increases, providing some evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis.

A contingent valuation (CV) method was performed to estimate the conservation value of the Woopo Wetland, Ramsar site, in Korea. The CV survey was rigorously designed to comply with the guidelines for best-practiced CV studies. Respondents overall accepted the hypothetical market and were willing to pay a significant amount (2,731 to 3,960 Korean won = USD 2.10 to 3.05), on average, per household annually to conserve the wetland. These findings have important implications for efforts to consider environmental quality in policy decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water management problems. The interest in this subject stems from two considerations: (i) water resources continue to be mismanaged, despite their recognized importance for sustainable development, in particular in developing countries; (ii) negotiated decision making has the potential to improve water management, yet there is still little formal understanding of the forces driving bargaining processes, and applications of formal negotiation theory to water issues are also lacking. This paper surveys the existing non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water management problems, with the purpose of preliminarily assessing whether such a formal approach in the phase of problem exploration and policy formulation can support decision makers in the real world. It is the contention of this paper that the proposed approach may offer direct and indirect support by: shortening the time needed to reach an agreement through the (theoretical) identification of an ‘acceptability space’, and helping select policies which are self-enforcing and, therefore, acceptable.