We find significant empirical links between the health structure of the population and the productive system of an economy that is subject to infectious disease, in particular tuberculosis. Consequently, development policy, aimed to improve the level of prosperity, has significant effects on the demographic-epidemiological dynamics of the population. Moreover, infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis, affect the size of the labour force and the productive capacity of the economy. We combine a Lotka-Volterra type system capturing the dynamics of TB epidemics with a Solow-Swan growth model where output is produced from capital and healthy labour. The demographic-epidemological parameters of the Lotka-Volterra type system are functions of GDP per healthy worker. We find significant differences between the most prosperous quartile and the rest of the world. In the former, the disease is eradicated whereas in the lowest three quartiles we predict damped capital and epidemic cycles converging to a population which is about 80 per cent of capacity and of whom about 2 per cent are TB infected. It follows that raising productivity in the lower quartiles is a critical policy aim.

As China advances its overall program of economic development, many Chinese cities consistently suffer from unhealthy levels of air pollution. One of the groups most affected is children. This paper provides some quantification regarding the extent of various morbidity costs upon children in portions of urban China. Using China-based health-effects and valuation studies, the authors project, and value in dollar figures, the number of averted cases of childhood colds, bronchitis, asthma, and respiratory-related hospital visits resulting from a lowering of air pollution levels. The results indicate that these child morbidity benefits may be substantial, with a mid-range value of nearly $3.5 billion over the period 2002–2011.

The overall goal of our paper is to better understand water management reform in China's rural communities, especially focusing on the effect that improving incentives to water managers will have on the nation's water resources and the welfare of the rural population. To pursue this goal, the paper has three objectives. First, we track the evolution of water management reform and seek to identify the incentive mechanisms that encourage water managers to more efficiently use water. Second, we identify the impact on crop water use of the incentives provided to water managers during reform. Since we are also interested in the possible negative consequences of an incentive-led water management reform strategy, the paper also explores how changes in incentives also affect agricultural production, farmer income, and poverty. Based on a random sample of 51 villages, 189 farmers, and 378 plots in four large irrigation districts in Ningxia and Henan provinces, both provinces in China's Yellow River Basin, our results show that in our sample areas the two main forms of water management reform, Water User Associations and contracting, have begun to systematically replace traditional forms of collective management. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that it is not the nominal implementation of the reform that matters, but rather it is the creation of new management institutions that offer water managers monetary incentives that lead to water savings. Importantly, given China's concerns about national food production and poverty alleviation, the reductions in water, at least in our sample sites, do not lead to reductions in either production or income, and do not increase the incidence of poverty.

This paper examines efficiency and equity in groundwater markets with special attention to output sharing contracts and to the bargaining relationships between sellers and buyers, using household level data from Madhya Pradesh, India. Regression results find no significant inefficiency on farms managed by output sharing buyers, presumably because optimal input intensities are achieved through effective monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms embedded in long-term and intensive personal relationships between sellers and buyers. As for equity, the finding is that, while output sharing buyers pay higher water prices, the rate of premiums is merely 5 percentage points higher than the informal interest rate that they would have had to carry under other types of groundwater contracts. The results also show that buyers who have access to alternative water sellers pay lower water prices. These findings indicate that if the imperfection of credit and contingent markets in rural areas are taken into account, informal groundwater markets work fairly well in agrarian communities if monitoring and contract adherence mechanisms are embedded and a sufficient number of potential sellers are available.

Hedonic valuation of quality attributes can be misleading when the assumption that these attributes are exogenous to sample selection is violated. This paper considers the simultaneity between hedonic valuation and sample selection in the context of a model of consumer behavior over packaged goods and investigates empirically how the decision on house location (urban/rural) affects the household's valuation of water-related characteristics of the house in question. The empirical analysis uses data from the Indonesian housing market and suggests that households value access to safe and improved domestic water sources. However, failing to correct for sample selection results in a biased valuation of willingness to pay for house characteristics. This might misguide policy recommendations for improved provision of domestic water, based on cost–benefit analysis.

The relationship between productive efficiency and sustainable development of fishing industries in developing countries has received little attention. Ill-structured property rights in common-pool resources lead to a contradiction between private and social technical efficiency, with private and social costs dependent on the level of technical efficiency. Development policies that increase private efficiency can increase the social cost with ill-structured property rights and common-pool resources, and thereby increase social inefficiency. This paper examines this relationship through a case study of the mini purse seine fishery of the Java Sea, and finds that private technical efficiency does not depend on any measurable attributes of human capital, diverges substantially between the peak and off seasons, and differs between vessels more within the off season.