For the most part, economic research in Latin America has had a ‘macro’ orientation (e.g., economic growth, monetary and fiscal policy, hyperinflation crisis). This is perfectly understandable because of the macro instability that has affected the entire region for decades and that still remains in many places. However, the composition of research is gradually changing as more attention is paid to a wider set of problems. Nowadays we see an increasing number of researchers in the region focusing on a variety of economic problems dealing with health, education, poverty alleviation, competition policy and the protection of natural resources and pollution control, among many others. This special issue of Environment and Development Economics presents a small sample of four research papers on these latter topics by researchers in established academic institutions in the region.

I review the few programs implemented in Latin America to control pollution with direct economic instruments and draw general lessons for the future implementation of these instruments in the region. The available evidence suggests that a combination of low capacities and political economy issues negatively affected the implementation of these programs. As a result, the capacity of the economic instruments to induce emission reductions cost effectively and their future political viability in these countries in the short- or medium-run may have been compromised. This present state of affairs provides more evidence in favor of the policy recommendation that Latin American countries should build local capacities before implementing direct economic instruments, than in favor of the alternative that these countries should adapt direct economic instruments to their institutional and political characteristics.

The collective action problem around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of appropriation and the asymmetries in access. We report the results of two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The irrigation game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented by a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia than in Kenya. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites.

This paper undertakes a quantitative analysis of the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of different trade agreements for Chile. A dynamic general equilibrium model is used to compare the consequences of unilateral liberalization and trade agreements with the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA). The results show that economic gains under the trade agreements are only significant if foreign investment increases or value added taxes are modified. Winners and losers depend on the agreement; however, unskilled labor-intensive sectors always progress. Consequently, these agreements seem to be good for the poorest groups. Some natural resource intensive sectors significantly increase their production with the EU and the US agreements, also increasing the environmental pressures. CO2 and PM-10 emissions are not very different under these agreements as compared to business as usual – under which environmental pressures increase significantly. The results show the importance of economy-wide analysis of trade agreements in developing contexts.

We estimate the implicit prices of the crime rate and airborne pollution in Chile, using spatially compensating price differentials in the housing and labor markets. We evaluate empirically the impact of different estimation strategies for the wage and rent equations, on the economic value of these two amenities. The results show that increments in the crime rate or in air pollution have a negative impact on welfare and that the estimated welfare measures and their variances are sensitive to selection bias, endogenous amenities and clustering effects. In contrast, the welfare measures do not seem to be very sensitive to the simultaneity bias.