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Sharing rules and the commons: evidence from Ha'apai, Tonga

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 August 2004

RABINDRA NATH CHAKRABORTY
RABINDRA NATH CHAKRABORTY
Affiliation:
Tigerbergstrasse 2, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland. Tel: +41-71-224-2583. Fax: +41-71-224-2722. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper argues that sharing rules have served to reduce the inefficiency caused by common pool externalities in many developing societies. To this end, a two-sector model of renewable resource use is employed where sharing rules are interpreted as implicit resource taxes. The model is applied to the island economy of Lofanga in the Kingdom of Tonga. The model generates a growth pattern which is consistent with the observed time paths of population and the resource stock. Cyclical fluctuations are weak even in the absence of resource taxation because the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is high.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , August 2004 , pp. 455 - 472
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

This paper is published posthumously, due to the tragic death of the author on 1 December 2002.