Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 May 2013
The paper analyzes the impact of environmental information dissemination by an information agent in a product market duopoly. The information agent performs the task of disseminating information regarding a green and a polluting firm's environmental profiles to consumers differing in their preferences for the two firms’ products. The result reveals that, in the absence of information dissemination, the green firm earns a lower market share which necessitates the information agent's intervention to encourage the consumption of green product. Moreover, complete information dissemination regarding the green firm's environmental profile is sufficient to generate a higher market share for the green firm. The paper also finds that an increase in information dissemination regarding either of the two firms’ environmental profiles decreases environmental damage accrued to the society and encourages a greener consumption pattern. An eco-efficiency drive is shown to be self-corrective as it negates the need for the informational intervention.