Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T07:19:46.999Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Intertemporal flexibility in a tradeable CO2 quota system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2000

HEGE WESTSKOG
Affiliation:
Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University of Oslo

Abstract

The paper compares the total costs of abating CO2 emissions in two different intertemporal trading systems. In addition, the paper gives an analysis of how abatement costs are distributed among different countries/regions. It is shown that the total cost of implementing a climate treaty is considerably reduced in a system where both banking and borrowing of quotas are allowed compared to a system where quotas only can be banked. The analysis also shows that the total cost of implementing a climate treaty can be reduced in a banking system by compensating the developing country parties for participating in the CO2 emission reductions such that their net costs of making emissions reductions after sale/purchase of quotas equal zero.

Type
Theory and Applications
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)