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An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2009

MICHAEL FINUS ,
M. ELENA SÁIZ  and
ELIGIUS M.T. HENDRIX
MICHAEL FINUS*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland. Email: [email protected]
M. ELENA SÁIZ
Affiliation:
Operations Research and Logistics Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands
ELIGIUS M.T. HENDRIX
Affiliation:
Operations Research and Logistics Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1: GAME THEORY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT , February 2009 , pp. 117 - 137
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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