This article explores cultural aspects of the unique archival patrimony of private account books that survive for Florence from the fourteenth to the early seventeenth century, a period corresponding to the city’s greatness as a center of both Renaissance culture and early capitalism. The discussion first surveys the diffusion and the standardization of accounting practice throughout the society, the educational process behind this development, and the emergence of the professional accountant. It then analyzes double entry in its application to both business (including industrial) and domestic accounts in the attempt to extend our knowledge of the accounting reality in this pre-modern capitalist economy beyond the traditional view derived from manuals and theoretical notions. The conclusion examines the cultural functions of Florentine accounting practice ranging from the so-called spirit of capitalism in the business world to some particular characteristics that disposed Florentines in general toward this kind of record keeping.

This article looks at the corporate history of J. Walter Thompson to examine the nature of U.S.-Mexican relations in the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II. It contends that local conditions, along with a cadre of “progressive” Good Neighbor Policy diplomats, forced American companies to adopt the role of “commercial diplomats,” altering the nature of what, up to 1940, had been a tense and bitter binational relationship. The article shows how Thompson's role as a commercial diplomat changed its previous “capitalist missionary” approach and how it complemented American diplomacy, including national security measures to displace German commercial influence in Mexico during Word War II.

Sample selection bias is a common problem in the business history literature. This paper proposes methods for researching and writing the history of firms and industries designed to address the problem. The key elements are a forward-looking perspective and close attention to the development over time of selection environments, the resources individual firms can mobilize, and understanding an agency within the firm or firms.

Between the 1970s and the 2000s, Costa Rica became established as the world’s leading ecotourism destination. This article argues that although Costa Rica benefited from biodiversity and a pleasant climate, the country’s preeminence in ecotourism requires more than a natural resource endowment explanation. While previous literature has emphasized the efforts of the government and nongovernment organizations, this article demonstrates the critical role of small entrepreneurs in the co-creation of the industry. Making extensive use of oral history, the article explores the role of tour companies in drawing affluent Western ecotourists to the country, and of the creators of ecolodges and other forms of accommodation in providing them with somewhere to stay. Clustering created positive externalities, drawing new entrepreneurs into the industry who could also learn from knowledge spillovers. There were downsides to the new industry. The creation of the national image of a natural paradise enabled many businesses which were not environmentally sustainable to free ride on the green image.

Between 1890 and 1940, motion pictures changed from technological novelties into heavily branded consumer products. The high sunk costs and short “shelf-life” of movies led film producers to borrow branding techniques from other consumer goods industries. They tried to build audience loyalty around a number of characteristics, but eventually learned that stars and stories were the most effective “promotion machines,” able swiftly to generate massive brand-awareness and to persuade consumers to see a new film. Data from the United States, Britain, and France showing the disproportionate distribution of income and fame among stars confirm their role as persuaders. Ultimately, film producers extended the life of their products by licensing their instant, tradable brands to other consumer goods industries.

During the 1990s, U.S. managerial capitalism underwent a profound transformation from a technocratic to a “proprietary” form. In the technocratic era, managers had functioned as teams to sustain the firm and to promote social welfare by satisfying the demands of competing stakeholders. In the new proprietary era, corporate bureaucratic teams broke up into tournaments in which managers competed for advancement toward the CEO prize. The reward system of the new era depended heavily on stock options that were accompanied by downside risk protection. The tournaments turned managers into a special class of shareholders who sought to maximize their individual utility functions even if deviating from the firm's best interest. Once this new regime became established, managers discarded their technocratic, stakeholder creed and adopted a property rights ideology, originally elaborated in academia by financial agency theorists. Managers hardly noticed (or cared) they were capturing a disproportionate share of the new wealth being generated in the U.S. economy. When critics brought this fact to light, managers replied like well-schooled economists: markets worked efficiently. Whether they worked fairly was a question they did not address.

In this paper we examine shoppers' reactions to the development of early supermarket retailing in post-war Britain. Positioning our discussion in relation to multi-disciplinary contributions on the role of consumers in innovation, we argue that more attention needs to be given to the shopper's input in the debate on retail innovation, including the supermarket. New oral history data drawn from a nationwide survey is presented in support of our arguments. Shoppers' contributions to the supermarket innovation are shown to be multi-faceted in nature, incorporating processes of co-production and value creation; processes that were altered in the transition from counter-service to self-service retail environments. Shoppers' discussions of such alterations were frequently structured around four aspects of interaction; with the physical environment of the store, with the goods for sale, with other shoppers and with shop staff. Whilst increasingly part of ‘ordinary consumption’ routines, the data highlights that in the switch to the supermarket, shopping became a more reflective activity and one that resulted in a variety of experiences and emotions.

This article is concerned with business strategies of political risk management during the twentieth century. It focuses especially on Beiersdorf, a pharmaceutical and skin care company in Germany. During World War I, the expropriation of its brands and trademarks revealed its vulnerability to political risk. Following the advent of the Nazi regime in 1933, the largely Jewish owned and managed company faced a uniquely challenging combination of home and host country political risk. This article reviews the company's responses to these adverse circumstances, challenging the prevailing literature that interprets so-called “cloaking” activities as one element of businesses' cooperation with the Nazis. We also depart from the previous literature in assessing the outcomes of the company's strategies after 1945 and examine the challenges and costs faced by the company in recovering the ownership of its brands. While the management of distance became much easier over the course of the twentieth century because of communications improvements, this article shows that the management of governments and political risk grew sharply.

This article poses three main questions: Does the civil-law tradition favor large, concentrated, universal banking systems? Does this sort of legal system work against the development of active securities markets? Do powerful universal banks (whether or not legal tradition lies at the root of bank power) replace securities markets or prevent them from operating efficiently? Based on evidence from Pre-World War I Germany, this paper argues that the answer to all three questions is “no.”

The role of the small shareholder has been largely ignored in the literature, which has tended to concentrate on controlling shareholders and family ownership. Yet, focus on the importance of small shareholders can capture significant aspects of financial development. Pre-1970 debates and policy conflicts linked to stock exchange development concentrated on shareholder democracy and diffusion as key indicators. This article explores the so-called democratization of investment and the factors behind it through the lens of trends in estimates of the UK and U.S. shareholding populations between 1895 and 1970. It covers three key periods: before World War I, before and after the stock market crash of 1929, and post-World War II. It identifies three periods in the United States when shareholder numbers were paramount: in the boom years of the 1920s, as part of the inquest into the 1929 crash, and post-World War II in an attempt to boost stock market activity. In the United Kingdom, although some concern was expressed during the 1920s and 1930s at the passive nature of small investors, who held diversified portfolios with small amounts in each holding, it was the fear of nationalization after World War II that led to more in-depth shareholder estimates.

Is it really useful to focus the interest of business historians on major companies that failed in recent years, like Parmalat in Italy or Enron in the United States? What can we learn from studying cases like that of the French company Schneider, a first mover in metallurgy, armaments, and nuclear energy, which for almost 150 years dominated the company town Le Creusot, where the Business History Conference held its fiftieth anniversary meeting in 2004, but which has now disappeared?

Since the Keynesian revolution in economics, a standard part of the profession’s analytical framework, and an argument for government support for investment, has been the multiplier concept. This classical multiplier works through consumption in an equilibrium model. Our contention is that there is also an entrepreneurial multiplier that works directly through investment by incentivizing or forcing investments in innovation in a dynamic, disequilibrium model. These investments have been analyzed as “spill-overs,” or responses to “bottlenecks,” or Schumpeterian examples of emulation. We suggest that the surges of innovation in capitalism were even broader than Schumpeter did, and that they can best be explored using a multiplier paradigm. We start that exploration by briefly examining selected patterns of entrepreneurship in the first, second, and third industrial revolutions. Our emphasis is on the sequences of innovations; the manner in which they are multiplied; and their economic, cultural, and political consequences. We delve into the first Industrial Revolution in New England and in Lombardy, Italy; the second Industrial Revolution in the United States and France, and the third Industrial Revolution in America and Europe. In all three of these dramatic capitalist transitions, there is evidence of the entrepreneurial multiplier at work, broadening, deepening, and extending the impact of the major innovations.

This article examines the origins and development of oil futures trading in the United States to demonstrate the important role that energy concerns played in the financialization of the U.S. economy in the 1970s and 1980s. The article contextualizes the emergence of oil futures contracts by narrating the longer history of U.S. futures markets and financialization. It also explores the halting development of oil futures contracts, and analyzes the three kinds of legitimating narratives that accompanied oil futures trading: reason, the primacy of price, and power. As a whole, the article argues that energy crisis discourse contributed significantly to the financialization of the U.S. economy by framing futures markets as the only viable solution to the energy crisis. The much-celebrated oil futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange supported and marked the emergent power of financial thinking as the United States entered a neoliberal era.

This article examines conceptions of social justice and economic fairness with regard to employment. It does so through an analysis of the management of deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields between the 1940s and 1980s. Emphasis is placed on the historical roots and social and political constitutions of labor market practices. The analysis is grounded within Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation; industrial relations within coal mining are conceived through an ongoing conflict between commodifying, liberalizing market forces and a “counter-movement” of worker and community resistance and state regulation, which works to embed markets within social and political priorities. E. P. Thompson’s moral economy provides the basis for an understanding of the formulation of communal expectations and employment practices that acted to mitigate the disruption caused by pit closures. The analysis grounds the historical roots of the moral economy within Poalnyi’s counter-movement and illuminates the operation of specific practices of a Thompsonian character within the nationalized industry, which maintained individual and collective employment stability. This is constructed utilizing interviews with former mineworkers and members of mining families. These are supplemented by archival sources that include the minutes of Colliery Consultative Committee meetings, which took place before pit closures. They reveal the moral economy was fundamentally centered on the control of resources, collieries, and the employment they provided rather than simply elements of financial compensation for those suffering from labor market instability. Resultantly procedure centering on collective consultation was fundamental in legitimating colliery closures.

This article reports on the methodology for recruiting oral history interviewees for a project on the history of shopping center development in Australia. Snowball sampling produced a data set that added value to extant archival and media sources, rendering detailed information about firm operations, strategies, and innovations. The construction of the sample was also revealing of the industry itself, with interviewee referral chains connecting individuals across firms, industry sectors, and generations. These links marked not only social connections but also paths through which knowledge was transferred via mentoring or shared experience, personal friendships that developed in workplaces, and professional contacts that evolved within a complex and constantly changing industry. Snowball sampling, though, also proved to be selective and contingent on the social networks of interviewees, requiring ongoing management of the chain referral process.

From Memory to Mastery explores the development of commercial numeracy and accounting in America and the English-speaking Atlantic world between 1750 and 1880. Most histories of accounting begin in the factories of England and New England, largely ignoring slave economies. I analyze both traditional sites of innovation, including textile mills and iron forges, and also southern and West Indian plantations. Along several dimensions, the calculative practices of slave owners advanced ahead of northern merchants and manufacturers, and many recorded and analyzed the productivity of their human capital with cruel precision. Following threads from Jamaica and Barbados to the American South, I show how plantation power relations stimulated the development of new accounting practices. The control of planters over their slaves made data easier to collect and more profitable to use. Commercial recordkeeping also expanded in free factories, but in different ways than on southern plantations. The mobility of labor made accounting necessary for keeping track of wages but relatively futile for detailed productivity analysis.

By the end of the twentieth century, it had become clear that the grand synthesis laid out by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in The Visible Hand, Scale and Scope, and other writings was badly in need of revision. It was in need of revision because the type of enterprise that Chandler took to be the acme of capitalist economic organization–the large, vertically integrated, horizontally diversified, managerially directed corporation–was clearly in retreat. This development cast into doubt not only the substantive content of Chandler’s interpretation but also its methodological underpinnings.

In France, between 1870 and 1914, the business world was very concerned with the increase in “fraud” and “counterfeiting” in beverages and foodstuffs. This paper explores the origin and significance of this phenomenon. Three main products and markets are analyzed: wine, butter, and milk. On the basis of primary research, the paper contests the traditional interpretation according to which adulteration was linked to an increasing demand for food by low-income classes in highly imperfect markets. The paper adopts a radically different approach by questioning the way innovation is defined and perceived in a market economy: why is it common to speak of “innovation” for manufactures while evoking the term “adulteration” when food and drinks are concerned? The argument is that food and drink adulteration had its origins in technical progress (the introduction of chemistry into the food industry), urbanization, and the internationalization of the economy. As such, adulteration was a juridical category that was mobilized on occasions by economic lobbies in order to benefit from rents in the market, while continuously regulating innovation by agreement and compromise.One clear implication is that quality is not an objective, ahistorical category but that at different times different definitions of an item's quality compete with one another. It was only after the institutional and legal framework had been defined that social conventions and consumers' choices could take effect.

The relative importance of financial services in national economies varied over the course of the twentieth century. Rajan and Zingales note that “by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels” and that “indicators of financial development fell in all countries after 1929, reaching their nadir around 1980. Since then has been a revival of financial markets.” This revival of financial markets over the last thirty years has led to the study of “financialization” that is variously defined with differing uses, but here is understood as “the growing importance of financial markets as a source of profits in the economy.”