In the century and half since its 1861 unification, Italy has left the periphery of the world economy and reached a level of wealth close to that of industrialized core Western countries. Since the 1990s, however, the process of globalization has exposed the weakness of the Italian productive system, and the country’s economic performance has been one of the worst in the world. This pattern raises questions about the very nature of the Italian economy, its historical development, and its relative success in the long run, demonstrating the need for a structural reassessment of these themes. The aim of this special forum is to provide such analysis, offering a systematic and innovative view based on the interaction between institutions (conceived as the rules of the game of economic agents), firm structure, and economic performance. The main hypothesis discussed in all four articles is that Italian capitalism has been negatively affected by inefficient institutions that had a strong impact on firms’ size and governance, managerial practices, and attitude to innovate. As a result, the Italian economic performance has been frustrated, rather than promoted, by the institutional environment, and in large part shaped by fortunate contingencies.

After the editors’ introduction, the special forum starts with a reconstruction of the macroeconomic scenario (“Italy’s Modern Economic Growth, 1861–2011”), using the state-of-the-art data and focusing not only on the process of growth, but also on the problems of living standard, inequality, and regional disparities. The second article (“Institutions, Politics, and the Corporate Economy”) focuses on the exceptionality of the Italian industrial structure characterized by the large dominance of small firms. The authors explain how the institutional setting has played a crucial role in determining the contrasting performance of big business on the one hand, and of small firms on the other. The third article in the forum (“The Ghost in the Attic? The Italian National Innovation System in Historical Perspective, 1861–2011”), which provides a broad reconstruction of long-term trends in science and technology, analyzes the Italian innovative capabilities in the long run. The authors explain how the institutional setup has determined the Italian attitude toward technological innovation in the different historical phases, and suggest that the Italian national innovation system, from the unification until today, has been characterized by a peculiar shadowy or ghostly nature. The last article (“Happy 150th Anniversary, Italy? Institutions and Economic Performance Since 1861”), which also synthesizes the very message of the forum, focuses on the mechanisms on which institutions work. The authors argue that Italian economic development has been characterized in the long run by poor formal institutions, which led to a suboptimal pattern of growth characterized by scarce investment in education, low salaries, imitative technologies, and exploitative management of firms by owners who were mainly stockholders rather than stakeholders.

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

Under the leadership of Tiny Rowland, Lonrho became the largest and most widely established company in post-independence Africa. Using newly available materials mainly from the National Archives London, this article investigates the activities of Lonrho in Africa and the company’s relationship with the British government during the period. Although Prime Minister Edward Heath publicly labeled the company as the “unacceptable face of capitalism,” evidence presented in this article suggests that this was at best a normative assertion. The subsequent Department of Trade and Industry investigation of Lonrho was carefully guided by the British government with the objective of protecting wider British interests in Africa. Evidence in this article therefore contradicts the view that the British government did not work “in concert” with British businesses in Africa once political independence became imminent.

The London House of Rothschild depended on Brazil to maintain its reputation. This became a problem in the 1890s, when the Brazilian government almost defaulted on its sovereign debt after a change of regime had made politics unstable and economic policy unorthodox. This article shows how the relationship between the bank and the state developed to the point that Rothschilds was forced to rescue its client. Exposure enabled Brazil to implement policies designed to defend the regime at the expense of payment capacity without defaulting. The debt crisis ended only after the political situation stabilized toward the close of the century, when the bank pressured the government to tighten economic policy.

The British trustee savings banks that operated throughout the nineteenth century were designed expressly for working-class use, and solely to promote long-term saving. Despite the substantial numbers and national spread of these banks, there have been few studies of their use by savers. Their neglect as a data source is puzzling, given the extent of the surviving depositor records that provide long-run empirical data that includes savers’ identity, marital status, and occupation, as well as account balances and transactions. Our preliminary work on four banks (Limehouse, Newcastle, South Shields, and Bury) shows results of significant interest in understanding working-class financial behavior, including a substantial number of accounts opened and maintained by working-class married women, accounts opened and run by minors from earnings, and varied patterns of account usage.