Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-15T09:23:03.906Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Universalizing and the we: endogenous game theoretic deontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2020

Paul Studtmann  and
Shyam Gouri Suresh Open the ORCID record for Shyam Gouri Suresh [Opens in a new window]
Paul Studtmann
Affiliation:
209 Ridge Road, Department of Philosophy, Davidson College, DavidsonNC28036, USA
Shyam Gouri Suresh*
Affiliation:
209 Ridge Road, Department of Economics, Davidson College, DavidsonNC28036, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium.

Keywords

Kantian ReasoningMorality in Game Theory
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , July 2021 , pp. 244 - 259
Check for updates
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alger, I. and Weibull, J.W. 2013. Homo moralis – preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching. Econometrica 81, 2269–2302.Google Scholar
Alger, I. and Weibull, J.W. 2016. Evolution and Kantian morality. Games and Economic Behavior 98, 56–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bacharach, M. 1997. “We” Equilibria: A Variable Frame Theory of Cooperation. Oxford: Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford.Google Scholar
Binmore, K. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Bolton, G. and Ockenfels, A. 2000. ERC — a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, C., Payne, K. and Doris, J.M. 2013. Morality in high definition: emotion differentiation calibrates the influence of incidental disgust on moral judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49, 719–725.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chant, S.R. and Ernst, Z. 2008. Epistemic conditions for collective action. Mind 117, 549–573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. 2006. A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 54, 293–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feinberg, J. 1989. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume 3: Harm to Self. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilbert, M. 1992. On Social Facts. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gold, N. and Sugden, R. 2007. Collective intentions and team agency. Journal of Philosophy 104, 109–137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grafton, R.Q., Kompas, T. and Long, N.V. 2017. A brave new world? Kantian–Nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation. European Economic Review 99, 31–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, D. 1978 [1739]. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Bigge and P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1996 [1781]. Critique of Pure Reason, ed. J.W. Ellington, P. Kitcher and W.S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.Google Scholar
McCann, H.J. and Bratman, M.E. 1991. Intention, plans, and practical reason. Noûs 25, 230.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newton, J. 2017. Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration. Games and Economic Behavior 104, 517–534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Petrinovich, L. and O’Neill, P. 1996. Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions. Ethology and Sociobiology 17, 145–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plato 2010 [375 BCE]. The Republic of Plato, Reissue Edition, ed. J. Adam. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Rabin, M. 1993. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83, 1281–1302.Google Scholar
Roemer, J.E. 2010. Kantian equilibrium. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 112, 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, J.E. 2015. Kantian optimization: a microfoundation for cooperation. Journal of Public Economics 127, 45–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roemer, J.E. 2019. How We Cooperate: A Theory of Kantian Optimization. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, A.S. 2004. Shared agency and contralateral commitments. Philosophical Review 113, 359–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Searle, J.R. 1990. Intentionality and its place in nature. In Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry: Resources for Understanding Mental Processes, ed. Cole, D.J., Fetzer, J.H. and Rankin, T.L., 267–280. New York, NY: Springer Publishing.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, A. 1974. Choice, ordering and morality. In Practical Reason, ed. Körner, S., 54–67. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1977. Rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, 317–344.Google Scholar
Singer, P. 1972. Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 229–243.Google Scholar
Smerilli, A. 2014. Theories of team reasoning. Philosophical Readings 6, 24–34.Google Scholar
Swain, S., Alexander, J. and Weinberg, J.M. 2008. The instability of philosophical intuitions: running hot and cold on truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, 138–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomson, J.J. 1976. Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. Monist 59, 204–217.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tuomela, R. and Miller, K. 1988. We-intentions. Philosophical Studies 53, 367–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallace, R.J. 2013. The deontic structure of morality. In Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Darcy, ed. Bakhurst, D., Little, M.O. and Hooker, B., 137–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, J.C. 2010. On intuitional stability: the clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic. Cognition 115, 491–503.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed