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Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 October 2019

Jacob Barrett Open the ORCID record for Jacob Barrett [Opens in a new window]
Jacob Barrett*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 213 Social Sciences Building, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Hobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.

Keywords

Thomas HobbesJohn Lockethe state of naturepunishmentmoral disagreement
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , November 2020 , pp. 334 - 354
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Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019

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