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The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Isaac Levi
Isaac Levi
Affiliation:
Columbia University
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Extract

In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach to human knowledge and valuation favored by the American pragmatists, Charles Peirce and John Dewey. A feature of any acceptable view of inquiry ought to be that during an inquiry points under dispute ought to be kept in suspense pending resolution through inquiry.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , April 1986 , pp. 23 - 53
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

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