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OPPORTUNITY AND PREFERENCE LEARNING: A REPLY TO CHRISTIAN SCHUBERT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2015

Robert Sugden
Robert Sugden*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK. Email: [email protected]. URL: https://www.uea.ac.uk/economics/people/profile/r-sugden
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Abstract:

This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion is much more generally applicable than Schubert's criterion of ‘opportunity to learn’.

Keywords

opportunityopportunity criterionpreference learningresponsibility
Type
Reply
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 297 - 303
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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