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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF DECISION THEORY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 August 2015

Samir Okasha
Samir Okasha*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol BS6 6JL, UK. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/school-of-arts/people/samir-okasha.
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Abstract:

This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an agent's preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with.

Keywords

Decision theoryexpected utilitybehaviourismmentalism
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , November 2016 , pp. 409 - 433
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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