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Ne Hic Saltaveris: The Marxian Theory of Exploitation After Roemer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Gilbert L. Skillman
Gilbert L. Skillman
Affiliation:
Wesleyan University
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Extract

In his book A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (1982) (hereafter GT), John Roemer employs the tools of mainstream general equilibrium and game-theoretic analysis to develop a fundamental critique and broadbased reformulation of Marxian economic theory. Perhaps Roemer's most striking departure from traditional Marxian tenets lies in his explanation of the material basis of exploitation in capitalist economies. Roemer argues that capitalist exploitation must be understood as essentially the consequence of exchange given differential ownership of relatively scarce productive assets (DORSPA). In particular, Roemer concludes that capitalist exploitation does not fundamentally depend on capitalist domination of production, or what Marx termed the subsumption of labor under capital.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , October 1995 , pp. 309 - 331
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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