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MUST GROUP AGENTS BE RATIONAL? LIST AND PETTIT'S THEORY OF JUDGEMENT AGGREGATION AND GROUP AGENCY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2012

Robert Sugden
Robert Sugden*
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia, [email protected]
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Extract

As a writing partnership, Christian List and Philip Pettit are probably best known for a paper in Economics and Philosophy that describes and generalizes the ‘discursive dilemma’ (List and Pettit 2002). That paper is one of the main points of reference for what is now a large literature on the aggregation of judgements – a literature to which List and Pettit have continued to contribute, individually and jointly. Their new book Group Agency reviews and synthesizes that body of work, and proposes an analysis of group agency in which the aggregation of judgements plays a central role.

Type
Critical notice
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 28 , Issue 2: Formal Ethics , July 2012 , pp. 265 - 273
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

REFERENCES

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