Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-29T05:10:20.989Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

EQUALITY VERSUS PRIORITY: A MISLEADING DISTINCTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 May 2015

Daniel M. Hausman
Daniel M. Hausman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53711. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hausman.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

The question for those who are concerned with inequalities is not whether to be an egalitarian or a prioritarian. That choice is mislabelled and misconceived. The relevant question is why distributive inequalities are of more than merely instrumental importance with respect to unrelated goals, such as maximizing well-being. The answer is that lessening inequalities in well-being serves a fundamental commitment to equality of moral status. Depending on the circumstances and what is to be distributed, the underlying concern with equality of moral status (coupled with non-distributional concerns about deprivation) might make one resemble a prioritarian, a non-prioritarian egalitarian, or neither.

Keywords

EgalitarianismPrioritarianismMoral StatusWell-being
Type
Symposium on Equality versus Priority
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 229 - 238
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Anderson, E. 1999. What is the point of equality? Ethics 109: 287–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fleurbaey, M. 2015. Equality versus priority: how relevant is the distinction? Economics and Philosophy 31: 203–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Miller, D. 1982. Arguments for equality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7: 73–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, D. 1991. Equality or Priority? The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas; Reprinted in The Ideal of Equality, ed. Clayton, M. and Williams, A., 81–125. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raz, J. 1984. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Tawney, R. H. 1931. Equality. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Co.Google Scholar
Temkin, L. 1993. Inequality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walzer, M. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York, NY: Basic Books.Google Scholar