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DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON SAVING LIVES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2007

DOUGLAS MACLEAN
DOUGLAS MACLEAN*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Abstract

In “Weighing Lives”, John Broome defends a very weak consequentialist account of the value of saving lives. This paper challenges the commitments of this kind of account and describes some reasons for saving lives that would appeal to a non-consequentialist.

Type
Symposium
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2007 , pp. 89 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

REFERENCES

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