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Collective preferences, obligations, and rational choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2001

Margaret Gilbert
Margaret Gilbert
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
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Abstract

Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?

Type
Research Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , April 2001 , pp. 109 - 119
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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