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CALCULATING QALYS: LIBERALISM AND THE VALUE OF HEALTH STATES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2017

Douglas MacKay
Douglas MacKay*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Policy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Abernethy Hall 217, CB 3435, 131 S. Columbia St., Chapel Hill, NC 27599USA. E-mail: [email protected]; URL: http://dmackay.web.unc.edu.
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Abstract:

The value of health states is often understood to depend on their impact on the goodness of people's lives. As such, prominent health states metrics are grounded in particular conceptions of wellbeing – e.g. hedonism or preference satisfaction. In this paper, I consider how liberals committed to the public justification requirement – the requirement that public officials choose laws and policies that are justifiable to their citizens – should evaluate health states. Since the public justification requirement prohibits public officials from appealing to controversial conceptions of the good life, liberals committed to this principle face a significant puzzle.

Keywords

QALYpublic justificationpriority settinghealth policyliberal neutrality
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 259 - 285
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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