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BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2004

Thorsten Clausing
Thorsten Clausing
Affiliation:
University of Magdeburg
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Abstract

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , April 2004 , pp. 89 - 115
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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