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An intersubjective model of agency for game theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2020

Vivienne Brown Open the ORCID record for Vivienne Brown [Opens in a new window]
Vivienne Brown*
Affiliation:
The Open University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper proposes a new interpretation of non-cooperative games that shows why the unilateralism of best-reply reasoning fails to capture the mutuality of strategic interdependence. Drawing on an intersubjective approach to theorizing individual agency in shared context, including a non-individualistic model of common belief without infinite regress, the paper develops a general model of a 2 × 2 simultaneous one-shot non-cooperative game and applies it to games including Hi-Lo, Stag Hunt, Prisoners’ Dilemma, Chicken, BoS and Matching Pennies. Results include High as the rational choice in Hi-Lo, and Cooperate as a possible rational choice in the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

Keywords

‘each of us’intersubjective reasoningintersubjective expected payoff (ISEP) modelinstrumental cooperationresolvable coordination problems
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , November 2020 , pp. 355 - 382
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Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2020

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