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A STRAWSON–LEWIS DEFENCE OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2012

Jelle de Boer
Jelle de Boer*
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam and Delft University of Technology, the [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude (Strawson 1974). Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually cross-referring. As with a Lewis-norm, the loop can get started in a variety of ways. It is self-sustaining in the sense that people with social preferences have sufficient reason not to deviate.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , November 2012 , pp. 291 - 310
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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