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The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2009

Jean Hampton
Jean Hampton
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Extract

Expected-utility (EU) theory has been a popular and influential theory in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. While its original developers, von Neumann and Morgenstern, presented it as a purely predictive theory useful to the practitioners of economic science, many subsequent theorists, particularly those outside of economics, have come to endorse EU theory as providing us with a representation of reason. But precisely in what sense does EU theory portray reason? And does it do so successfully?

There are two strikingly different answers to these questions in the literature. On the one hand, there is the view of people such as David Gauthier that EU theory is an implementation of the idea that reason's only role is instrumental. On the other hand, there is the view suggested by Leonard Savage (1954/1972; and see Anderson, 1993) that the theory is a “formal” and noninstrumental characterization of our reasoning process.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , October 1994 , pp. 195 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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