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Decision under normative uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2021

Franz Dietrich Open the ORCID record for Franz Dietrich [Opens in a new window]  and
Brian Jabarian
Franz Dietrich*
Affiliation:
Paris School of Economics & CNRS, 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France
Brian Jabarian*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 17 Rue de la Sorbonne, 75005 Paris, France
*
Emails: [email protected]; [email protected]
Emails: [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.

Keywords

normative and empirical uncertaintygeneral frameworknormative uncertainty versus identity uncertainty in Harsanyi and Rawlsmaximizing expected valueex ante versus ex post perspective
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 38 , Issue 3 , November 2022 , pp. 372 - 394
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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