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The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences, Herbert Gintis. Princeton University Press, 2009. xviii + 281 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 January 2011

Peter Vanderschraaf
Peter Vanderschraaf*
Affiliation:
University of California Merced
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Type
Book Review
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 88 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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