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BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND PATERNALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2017

Daniel M. Hausman
Daniel M. Hausman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 5197 Helen C. White Hall, 600 N. Park Street, Madison, WI 53706-1474. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hausman
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Abstract:

Contemporary behavioural economics has documented common failures of reasoning that apparently make possible policies that benefit individuals by contravening or correcting their judgements. These policies appear to be paternalistic, even though a traditional view would deny that they are paternalistic on the grounds that policies such as nudges do not restrict individual liberty. It appears to many that a new definition of paternalism that takes its cue from behavioural economics is needed. Furthermore, if one revises the definition of paternalism, one must revisit traditional views concerning whether paternalist policies are wise. In Government Paternalism, Julian Le Grand and Bill New make a valuable start, although some corrections are needed. This essay provides a general setting for revising the definition of paternalism and suggests a revised definition of paternalism.

Keywords

paternalismnudgebehavioural economicsliberty
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 53 - 66
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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