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An ‘Inexact’ Philosophy of Economics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Roger E. Backhouse
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham

Extract

The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics (ISSE) (Hausman, 1992) represents the most ambitious attempt to provide a systematic account of economic methodology since the first edition of Blaug's The Methodology of Economics (1980). As such, it has been the subject of extensive critical commentary (for example, Blaug, 1992b; Backhouse, 1995; Miller, 1996; Hahn, 1996; Mäki, 1996). For all the attention it has received, however, some important aspects of the book's thesis have not been developed properly. Two important ones are (1) what might be called, following the terminology used in the experimental economics literature, the ‘framing effect’ of Hausman's definition of economics, and (2) the significance of Hausman's claim that economists are committed to developing economics as a ‘separate’ science. To understand these points it is important to make explicit the position from which Hausman approaches the philosophy of science.

Type
Essays
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1997

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