On 29 December 1838, the Dean of Exeter Cathedral, Whittington Landon, died. In the months that followed, the cathedral chapter repeatedly refused to elect the individuals nominated by the Crown, setting the stage for a protracted struggle that would play out in Parliament and in the Court of Queen's Bench. This is the story of R v The President and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of St Peter in Exeter.1

Cathedrals have been described as ‘normative space’ insofar as their regulation both shapes, and is shaped by, their architecture. This article extends that description and applies it, by analogy, to listed Church of England churches and examines how the concept of ‘normative space’ relates to, and informs, their regulation within ecclesiastical and secular systems. The article goes on to outline the implications for (1) architectural and artistic innovation and (2) the worship and mission of the Church.

The problem of relations between Church and state has existed from the very beginnings of Christianity and has evolved over centuries. The dominant model today is one of separation between the state and religious communities. In the context of the Roman Catholic Church, the Vatican City State remains the only exception to this principle. This article examines the tensions inherent in the way in which the Roman Pontiff, as head of the Vatican City State, exercises both religious and secular power, and how rule of law principles operate to constrain the operation of power as between the various organs of this state.

This article seeks to provide a constitutional law perspective on the contribution of the Lords Spiritual to the scrutiny of legislation in the House of Lords. It examines the legal basis of the bishops’ role in the Upper House and how this has evolved. It considers how far the bishops currently meet expectations about their role against the background of calls for reform of the House of Lords and changes in religious affiliation in the United Kingdom. The paper draws, amongst other things, on the experience of a group of current and former Lords Spiritual who shared their views with the author in the course of some informal semi-structured conversations. It also examines the relationship between the Lords Spiritual and the Church of England's national institutions. It concludes that the Lords Spiritual make a distinctive contribution to the legislature which should be maintained, with some modifications to meet the needs of the time.

To mark the passing of two decades since the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords handed down their judgment in the appeal of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank this article considers the enduring impact of the decision in terms of the constitutional position of the Church of England as a national church and analyses the public and private functions which it undertakes. In the altered landscape of the new Carolean era, with a decline in church attendance and a rise in secularism, it examines the reasoning of the five separate opinions delivered by the Law Lords and evaluates in retrospect various of the issues raised.

This article explores the interpretation and application of the term ‘doctrine’ within the Anglican Church of Australia and its implications in Australian civil law, particularly anti-discrimination legislation. It examines the tension between (1) the constitutional definition in the Church's constitution and (2) broader interpretations found in General Synod resolutions. The anxiety evident in the General Synod resolutions underscores ongoing debates within the Church about same-sex marriage and relationships and the application of secular exemptions in anti-discrimination legislation. The article concludes that the civil law definition of the term ‘doctrine’ is wide enough to encompass both the Anglican Church of Australia's constitutional definition and the broader meaning found in General Synod resolutions. Nevertheless, care needs to be taken by the Church to avoid the risk of civil courts being called upon to engage in their own exegesis of scripture, and thereby come to conclusions which are at odds with the avowed beliefs of the Church.

This article critiques the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re SA (Declaration of Non-Recognition of Marriage) [2023] EWCA Civ 1003. In Re SA the Court of Appeal held that: (1) by operation of section 16 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a voidable marriage is not void at its inception and is therefore not caught by section 58(5)(a) of the Family Law Act 1986, and (2) the effect of section 16 of the 1973 Act is that a voidable marriage starts off fully valid but only on making a decree absolute of nullity becomes invalid. This article contends that the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in SA is conceptually challenging, based on a misreading of the statutory language, and is directly contrary to long-established and powerful authorities.

American schools are governed by a complex lattice work of federal, state, and local laws and regulations, many of them tailored specifically to primary, secondary, or higher education. But all schools are subject to the same First Amendment guarantee that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’. This constitutional guarantee of religious freedom has produced a substantial body of case law. Nearly one-third of the United States Supreme Court's cases on religious freedom – 74 out of its 247 cases reported from 1815 to 20231 – have addressed issues of religion and education. All but six of these cases were decided after 1940, the year the Court first began to apply these guarantees to state and local governments alongside ‘Congress’;2 and for each Supreme Court case, there are scores of lower federal court and sometimes state court cases that add further nuance and amplification. This article summarises, and critically analyses, this ever-evolving jurisprudence.

This article discusses the application of the proportionality test which the Court of Session in Scotland and the European Court of Human Rights carried out when reviewing the limitations to worship and public gatherings imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The article concludes that judges should not use the proportionality standard of review as an avenue to circumvent their duty of neutrality towards religious dogmas.

In May 2021, Jesus College Cambridge submitted to the Diocese of Ely a ‘faculty petition’ – that is, a formal request to alter the fabric of an ecclesiastical building – asking for permission to remove from the west wall of the college chapel a large memorial to Tobias Rustat, ‘because of Rustat's known involvement in the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans’. On 23 March 2022, following hearings the month before, Hodge Dep Ch provided a written judgment in which he denied the application. The college, he said, had not provided a convincing case that the removal of the monument was ‘necessary to enable the Chapel to play its proper role in providing a credible Christian ministry and witness to the College community’, and such a case was needed to outweigh the ‘considerable, or notable, harm’ that would result from the removal ‘to the significance of the Chapel as a building of special architectural or historic interest’.

The origins of this comment lie in Charles George KC's article: ‘Do we still need the faculty system?’1 which came towards the end of his tenure of office as Dean of the Arches and Auditor (2009–2020). George himself acknowledged that his conclusion, namely that a no-holds-barred review of the faculty system would now be appropriate, might come as ‘rather a surprise’ and that some might have expected his answer to his own question to be in the affirmative: namely, that we do still need a faculty system.

On 6 December 2023, seven-year-old William Brown was struck and killed by a hit-and-run driver when he was retrieving his football from the road outside his home. A Year 3 pupil at St Eanswythe's Church of England Primary School in Folkestone, he had walked through the grounds of St Mary and St Eanswythe's Church every day on his way to school and had attended services there. His parents wanted to bury him in the churchyard, but although the Vicar was willing to conduct the burial, the churchyard had been closed by Order in Council in 1857 under the provisions of the Burial Act 1855, with only one exception being made for a burial in 1898. Because the churchyard had been closed, under section 1 of that Act his burial would require an Order of the Privy Council.

This Comment, based substantially on a lecture delivered to the Ecclesiastical Law Society on 5 July 2023, will explore how bishops engage with the legislature, comparing the example of Bishop George Bell in the last century with a rather different example in the present century, namely Pope Benedict XVI and his address to members of Parliament in Westminster Hall in 2010. The comparison will, I hope, indicate some historic dimensions to the issues of episcopacy, law and government that are pertinent today.

On 4 December, the Home Secretary unveiled a new package of measures to reduce immigration – a matter of great interest to faith communities, given that some of them depend fairly heavily on clergy and lay-workers from overseas to sustain their pastoral ministries. One of the elements in his statement to the Commons was a decision to ‘increase the skilled worker earnings threshold by a third to £38,700 from next spring, in line with the median full-time wage for those kinds of jobs’ and to raise the minimum income for family visas ‘to the same threshold as the minimum salary threshold for skilled workers, which is £38,700’.1

Probably the biggest legal news of the period under consideration was the judgment of the Supreme Court in R (AAA (Syria) & Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42, [2023] WLR 4433, in which it held unanimously that the Government's policy of sending asylum-seekers to Rwanda was unlawful. One critical issue was that under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a right under the ECHR – and the Secretary of State is a public authority for that purpose.

Enlightenment values were a necessary adjunct to, although not solely responsible for, the Western legal tradition. This is because the Enlightenment produced a lens through which human relations could be viewed, and this perspective strongly influenced the invention of law in the West.1 Eastern Orthodoxy developed its own philosophical system without reference to Enlightenment values. The East's failure to engage with those values has resulted in a failure to find a common ‘language’ through which East and West can speak to one another. This inability to speak a common language places the Orthodox Church at a distinct disadvantage in its relations with the West, and has done for a very long time.

During the reign of Elizabeth I the ecclesial and legal ‘revolution’ under Henry VIII, to establish in England a national church under the royal supremacy, was converted into a ‘settlement’. It steered a course between radical puritans and recusant Catholics. Clothed in legal propriety, this settlement was articulated both juristically and theologically by the great Richard Hooker (d. 1600). After the return to Rome under Mary, the Elizabethan Acts of Parliament re-established the English Church, revived legislation made under Henry VIII and Edward VI, and imposed uniformity in worship. The period also sees the use of ‘soft-law’, like Articles, Admonitions, and Advertisements. Parliament rejects the Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum in 1571, but Canons were passed piecemeal in 1571, 1575, 1585, and 1598. The turn of the Welsh Tudors to rule ended in 1603. The Scottish Stuarts came next. The reign of James I (1603–1625) saw bitter dispute between the King and the common lawyers over the royal supremacy in matters ecclesiastical. But there was one lasting legal landmark: the Canons Ecclesiastical 1603/4. This new code was studied theologically by a contemporary cleric, Francis Mason. Whilst several notable civilians from that time have become well-known – such as John Cowell (d. 1611), Daniel Dun (d. 1617), Clement Colmore (d. 1619), and Thomas Ridley (d. 1629), Francis Mason is largely unknown. However, he is very worthy of inclusion in the canon of Anglican priest-jurists. What follows sketches the life and career of Mason, outlines his treatise on the Canons, and discusses that treatise in a wider context, including comparing it with a similar work by Bishop Edward Stillngfleet (d. 1699).

On 22 May, standing outside the door of No. 10 in pouring rain (and for some unfathomable reason sans umbrella), the Prime Minister announced that there would be a General Election on 4 July and Parliament was duly prorogued on 24 May and dissolved on 30 May. Before that, however, there was a flurry of legislative business by agreement between the two front benches.

The first item of business at the February group of sessions was to revive the General Synod (Remote Meetings) (Temporary Standings Orders) Measure 2020, which enabled Synod to conduct hybrid meetings. Previously in operation during the COVID-19 pandemic, the standing order had lapsed and was brought back into operation until 5 February 2026.