This paper examines the concept of ‘transformative accommodation’, which the Archbishop of Canterbury invoked in his February 2008 lecture on ‘Civil and religious law in England’, stressing the need for both the state and religious communities to contemplate internal change. Although he made no substantive proposals on jurisdictional issues, this proved the focus of subsequent public comment. I suggest that jurisdictional issues cannot be avoided, despite the diplomatic interest in doing so, as may be seen from a reading of the January 2008 European Islamic ‘Charter of Values’. Missing from the debate thus far is consideration of the (necessarily theological) criteria for accommodation within religious communities. I seek to provide a preliminary discussion of such criteria from the viewpoint of Jewish law. First, an outline of some published research on religious marriage in Judaism and Christianity is provided as a case study. I then sketch the jurisdictional situation in the modern State of Israel, before considering the possibilities for transformative accommodation in English law, in the light of the preceding analysis. A brief conclusion indicates some questions that the analysis might pose for Christianity.1

Details of complaints under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 are beginning to come into the public domain. In particular, they raise questions as to the appropriate penalties to be imposed on a respondent, although even more worrying may be the anecdotal misunderstanding among some of the clergy about the moral behaviour expected of them. In addition, procedural questions remain that are not addressed in the written determinations. Such questions include the proper interest in making, and the motive behind, a complaint; the admissibility of hearsay evidence to support a complaint; and episcopal intervention and the bishop's role in reaching his decision.

The Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church establishes the right of the Church to proclaim the Gospel and expound it, and to proclaim moral principles especially when this is required by fundamental rights or ‘for the salvation of souls’ (Canon 747). While this was taken for granted for centuries, society and culture have undergone rapid and extensive changes, especially over the last forty years. From what was once a Christian society and culture, we have moved to a multicultural and secular society, and have seen the rise of ‘ideological secularism’. The place of religion and religious values in the public forum is being questioned, and an aggressive secularism seeks to reduce religion and its practice to the private sphere. However, a healthy secularity should recognise both the autonomy of the state from control by the Church and also the right of the Church to proclaim its teaching and comment on social issues for the common good of humanity. This right is recognised in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. From the Church's point of view, this right was recognised for all religions in the Second Vatican Council's ‘Declaration on Religious Liberty’. We must defend that right because the Church exists not for its own sake but for the sake of humanity.

In Spain, immigration has been one of the main reasons for a significant number of conflicts regarding the use of religious symbols. In this context, the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Spanish Constitution are expected to play a very important role as a criterion to solve these tensions. However, a more accurate response is provided by case law, where the variety of circumstances that surround each conflictual situation can be taken into account to reach the best solution.1

In January 2009, this Journal published an article by Kenyon Homfray, ‘Sir Edward Coke gets it wrong? A brief history of consecration’, which was concerned with the historical origins of a legal concept of consecration. While it is not especially germane to the direction of Mr Homfray's argument, his statement that ‘[i]n England, consecration does not appear to have any recognised legal effect on any land or building not belonging to the Church of England’ was somewhat surprising. It may be that he intended the expression ‘belonging to the Church of England’ as meaning no more than ‘affiliated to’ the Church of England or something similar. If that is all that was meant, then the statement could be accepted as more or less correct: consecration for worship according to the rites of, for example, the Roman Catholic Church would not have any effect in English law. But the words ‘belonging to’ would naturally tend to imply ownership of the land or building in question by the Church of England, in which case some qualification is needed. It may, therefore, be helpful to set out, briefly, the extent to which consecration is recognised, and has effect, in English law.

The decision in Eweida v British Airways that there was no discrimination where a Christian member of check-in staff was not allowed to wear her cross visibly at work has received much publicity, despite the fact that BA changed its policy before the case even reached the tribunal. The case raises many questions about the equal treatment of religions and the question of whether religious practices must be mandatory before they are protected, issues which have been discussed elsewhere in this Journal. The focus of this article, however, is the implications of the decision for the application of indirect discrimination to those who hold minority religious views.

The Charity Commission's final guidance on The Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit met with cautious approval, not least because it is considerably more user-friendly than the rather tortuous exposure draft that preceded it. Several aspects of that draft were arguable: the final version resolves many of the uncertainties.

The Cremation (England and Wales) Regulations 2008, which were put in place in the wake of the Shipman murders and the subsequent inquiry by Dame Janet Smith, came into effect on 1 January 2009. They modernise and consolidate all previous regulations, and replace the Cremation Regulations 1930, as amended. However, the new Regulations are themselves an interim measure, to be replaced in due course by a new system of death certification under the Coroners and Justice Bill, which was introduced into the House of Commons in January 2009.