The Lutheran Reformation transformed not only theology and the Church but also law and the State. Despite his early rebuke of law in favour of the gospel, Martin Luther eventually joined up with various jurists and political leaders to craft ambitious legal reforms of Church, State and society on the strength of his new theology, particularly his new two-kingdoms theory. These legal reforms were defined and defended in hundreds of monographs, pamphlets and sermons published by Lutheran writers from the 1520s onwards. They were refined and routinised in equally large numbers of new Reformation ordinances that brought fundamental changes to theology and law, Church and State, marriage and family, criminal law and procedure, and education and charity. Critics have long treated this legal phase of the Reformation as a corruption of Luther's original message of Christian freedom from the strictures of all human laws and traditions. But Luther ultimately realised that he needed the law to stabilise and enforce the new Protestant teachings. Radical theological reforms had made possible fundamental legal reforms, which, in turn, would make those theological reforms palpable. In the course of the 1530s and thereafter, the Lutheran Reformation became in its essence both a theological and a legal reform movement. It struck new balances between law and gospel, rule and equity, order and faith, and structure and spirit.

The concept of dignity has made its way into contemporary discourse on rights after having taken a winding road which intersected secular thinking with religious thinking. Its pervasive utilisation by courts shows its richness as well as its amorphousness. An enquiry into comparative law suggests that the concept of dignity, especially when it is associated with the idea of equality, creates tensions with claims to religious freedom. Such clashes cannot be reconciled on theoretical grounds, but only on practical ones, depending on context and according to proportionality scrutiny.

Recent reforms to English and Scots marriage law faced the United Reformed Church (URC) with two challenges. Its hybrid structure of church government, entwining Congregational and Presbyterian strands, complicated application of the statutory criterion ‘persons recognised by [the membership] as competent for the purpose of giving consent’. Precedent from earlier decisions on human sexuality explains the ultimate identification of the local church meeting as the competent council of the URC in England, and why the ‘enabling resolution’ passed regarding civil partnership formation was not repeated. The very different focus of Scots marriage law posed different questions, less focused on buildings or the churches using them and allowing willing celebrants to be nominated by the synod, as for opposite-sex marriage.

Advisers differed on whether the denomination possessed any binding doctrine of marriage which would obstruct implementation of the amended law. The General Assembly decision on polity and how it was reached suggest an implicit ruling in the negative. This article defends that outcome, considering the doctrinal foundation of the URC in the light of concessions made at the formative union. Marriage appears as a topic on which no denominational doctrine exists, letting all councils reach theological conclusions necessary to practical decisions within their remit.

The oath taken by British sovereigns at their coronations is laid down by a statute dating from 1688. Any oath taken other than in accordance with the correct statutory form is contrary to law. Taking the authorised form of the oath is a condition on which the crown is held by any individual. The oath taken by the present sovereign omitted the promise to govern according to the statutes agreed upon in Parliament. Any variance from the statutory form is problematic but the clause omitted is the clause that most clearly expresses the central concern of the Williamite settlement. The deficiencies in the oath taken, while reasonably apparent, do not appear to have been judicially recognised hitherto. The legal basis of the present oath has been raised in the political sphere but potential difficulties have been set aside on grounds of expediency. Given the unlawfulness of the oath taken, there is a political and constitutional imperative in establishing that deficiencies in the oath do not fatally taint the reign which follows. This article will advance two possible legal means of reconciling an improper oath with a perfectly valid reign.

A marriage in the Church of England or the Church in Wales may take place following the publication of banns of marriage (preferably during morning service) on three Sundays, by special licence of the Archbishop of Canterbury, by common licence or on the authority of a certificate issued by a superintendent registrar. Reports of the death of the church wedding have been somewhat exaggerated: in 2014, the Church of England conducted almost 50,000 weddings, while the Church in Wales conducted just over 3,000.

The EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill completed its passage through Parliament and received Royal Assent on 16 March. On 29 March, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to the European Union, Tim Barrow, handed over the Prime Minister's formal letter of notification under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union to the President of the European Council, thereby triggering the withdrawal process. Inevitably, however, the period since the last report was dominated not so much by Brexit as by the unexpected General Election.