The laws regulating how and where couples can get married – as opposed to who they can marry – are widely recognised as being in need of reform. The basic structure of the current law dates back to the Marriage Act 1836, and many elements – the requirements for Anglican weddings and differential treatment of Jewish and Quaker weddings – have a still longer history. Despite the law's longevity, many of the current requirements have their origins in past panics, tactical compromises or quick fixes. While the laws enacted in 1836 were shaped by their historical context, even then the legal framework did not fit how couples wanted to marry. This paper traces the history of marriage law reform to explain how we ended up with a set of laws that are highly restrictive, inconsistent and complex, and why reform is needed.

The Law Commission has consulted on provisional proposals for reform of the law governing how and where couples can get married in England and Wales. This article gives an overview of those proposals, with particular focus on religious weddings, including Anglican weddings. It examines proposed changes to each aspect of the process of getting married, from the preliminaries to the people required to officiate at the wedding, the permitted locations and the rules governing the content of the ceremony. The article argues that the legal status of marriage itself is highly flexible, recognising a range of unions. The proposed reforms aim to reflect the diverse range of views about the meaning of marriage, and ensure that the way in which the law recognises a legally binding wedding fits with the many different traditions according to which religious groups celebrate the formation of marriage.

The Terrorism Act 2000 recognises that religion may be a force for bad in its definition of ‘terrorism’: ‘The use or threat of action … designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’ ‘Radicalisation’ is the process by which an individual becomes involved in terrorism, and it is the statutory Prevent Duty, introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, that is the UK's current means of tackling radicalisation. Under the duty, specified authorities (such as schools, police, etc) must have due regard to preventing people from being ‘drawn into terrorism’. This article addresses an often-neglected area in the ongoing legal debate surrounding the statutory Prevent Duty: the religious dimension. It suggests that religion is at the centre of the Prevent Duty and that the formulation of the duty was stimulated by religion – namely, Islamist extremism and radicalisation. It will discuss the ways in which the Prevent Duty can be criticised; that it has an impact on human rights that it is potentially discriminatory towards Muslims; and that it does not clearly distinguish between permissible radical religion and impermissible harmful religion. The article concludes by suggesting that religion plays an important part in the understanding of extremism and radicalisation.

Humanity's challenges have become more acute in recent decades. The international environment has been characterised by rapid change, uncertainty, increased complexity and new trends. Despite the seeming unanimity of the international community in accepting human dignity and human rights as the foundation of a just society, the gap between systems and reality is widening around the world, exacerbated at the same time by globalisation and a liberal, individualistic and consumerist model of democracy. This article seeks to identify a new humanism that can be seen in UNESCO's work in the multifaceted field of culture, with culture as an enabler of sustainable development, peace and economic progress. On the one hand, it examines the confrontation between the politics of recognition and the politics of resentment in dealing with the management of diversity in increasingly complex societies. On the other hand, it analyses the relevance of religion, and particularly the work of the Holy See and successive popes, in culture, public ethics and social cohesion.

The Arches Court, the court of appeal of the Province of Canterbury in the Church of England, has existed for more than 700 years. Its evolution – driven by principle, politics and pragmatism – is a fascinating reflection of a key tribunal in the court system of the English Church, and the site of major historical and often contentious developments within the Church. Its appellate status has not changed; it still has jurisdiction over faculties and clergy discipline; its judge is still appointed by the archbishop; and its jurisprudence has contributed much to the development of English ecclesiastical law. However, over the centuries its jurisdiction has contracted; the courts to which appeals against its decisions lie have changed; its historical lawyers of civilian advocates and proctors have been replaced by common law barristers and solicitors; the title for its judge, Dean of Arches, has survived by accident; its procedure has been simplified; and its decisions have throughout its history been respected but today have the authority of binding precedents. The article takes the story up to 2018, when the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure provided that a decision of the Arches and of the provincial Chancery Court of York is today to be followed as if it were a decision of the other court.

Personally, I am feeling both buoyed up, and also a bit deflated, as a result of Norman's lecture (and the accompanying Ecclesiastical Law Journal article, to which the lecture is just an hors d'oeuvre). Buoyed up that, according to Oughton's treatise of 1728, in the seat of justice the dean should be addressed as Domine Judex or more frequently Domine Decane. Either will do excellently for the future! Deflated because, while Dean Phillimore's letters patent as Dean of the Arches recognised his ‘sound doctrine, good morals, purity of conscience’, my own were, probably rightly, considerably less effusive.