Background: Government reports have persistently indicated the intent of terrorists and hostile nations to acquire and “weaponize” nuclear materials for deliberate attack on a major US metropolitan city.

Methods: A modeling analysis of the effects of 20- and 550-kiloton nuclear detonations on the 2 major metropolitan centers of Los Angeles and Houston is presented with a focus on thermal casualties. Brode’s work as modified by Binninger was used to calculate thermal fluence, using thermal fractions. The EM-1 and WE programs were used to calculate blast effects. Fallout radiation was calculated using the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability V404SP4 with “urban effects” turned on. The ESRI ArcView program calculated affected populations from 2000 US Census block-level data for areas affected by thermal effects.

Results: The population affected by a 550-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in Los Angeles and Houston is staggering: surviving thermal casualties are estimated at 185,000 and 59,000, respectively. Even the 20-kiloton detonations in Los Angeles and Houston are significant: the numbers of surviving thermal casualties requiring care exceed 28,000 and 10,000, respectively.

Conclusions: The surviving health care community postdetonation would be faced with an unprecedented burden of care for thermal casualties. A great expansion of personnel involved in emergency burn care response is critical. Bold, new approaches such as regionalization and predetermined medical air transport need to be considered. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:80–89)

Background: On May 4, 2007 an EF5 tornado hit the rural community of Greensburg, KS, destroying 95% of the town and resulting in 12 fatalities.

Methods: Data was requested from the emergency medical services units that initially responded and the regional hospitals that received people injured in the tornado within 24 hours following the tornado. Requested data included patient age and sex, and injury severity score or ICD-9 codes. Critical mortality, or the number of deaths of critically injured patients, was also calculated.

Results: The extensive damage caused by the tornado effectively destroyed the infrastructure of the community and created enormous challenges for emergency medical services responders, who were unable to record any triage data. Area hospitals treated 90 patients, who had an average injury severity score of 6.4. Age was found to be related to injury severity, but no relationship between sex and injury severity was found. Critical mortality was found to be 18% for this event.

Conclusions: Injury severity score has seldom been used to analyze natural disasters, especially tornadoes, although such analysis is helpful for understanding the magnitude of the disaster, comparing to other disasters, and preparing for future incidents. Advanced warning and personal preparedness are important factors in reducing tornado-related injuries and deaths. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:90–95)

Background: To assess the state of health center integration into community preparedness, we undertook a national study of linkages between health centers and the emergency preparedness and response planning initiatives in their communities. The key objectives of this project were to gain a better understanding of existing linkages in a nationally representative sample of health centers, and identify health center demographic and experience factors that were associated with strong linkages.

Methods: The objectives of the study were to gain a baseline understanding of existing health center linkages to community emergency preparedness and response systems and to identify factors that were associated with strong linkages. A 60-item questionnaire was mailed to the population of health centers supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration’s Bureau of Primary Health Care in February 2005. Results were aggregated and a chi square analysis identified factors associated with stronger linkages.

Results: Overall performance on study-defined indicators of strong linkages was low: 34% had completed a hazard vulnerability analysis in collaboration with the community emergency management agency, 30% had their role documented in the community plan, and 24% participated in community-wide exercises. Stronger linkages were associated with experience responding to a disaster and a perception of high risk for experiencing a disaster.

Conclusions: The potential for health centers to participate in an integrated response is not fully realized, and their absence from community-based planning leaves an already vulnerable population at greater risk. Community planners should be encouraged to include health centers in planning and response and centers should receive more targeted resources for community integration. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:96–105)

Background: No definitive guidelines have been established in the United States for postexposure immunization and prophylaxis (PEP) to hepatitis B and C viruses (HBV, HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the event of a traumatic explosive event.

Methods: The American Medical Association’s Center for Public Health Preparedness and Disaster Response assembled a US-Israeli panel of experts, including representatives from disaster medicine, trauma surgery, occupational health, and infectious disease to determine guidelines for adult and pediatric victims following a traumatic explosive event. The panel reviewed the existing Israeli and United Kingdom protocols, previously published Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance on occupational and nonoccupational exposures to HBV, HCV, and HIV, before reaching consensus on preliminary guidelines for the United States.

Results: These guidelines recommend an age-appropriate dose and schedule for HBV PEP for individuals presenting from the scene with nonintact skin or mucous membrane exposure, and they also consider HCV and HIV testing in individuals presenting with possible nonintact skin or mucous membrane exposure. The guidelines do not recommend PEP for individuals presenting from the scene with possible superficial skin exposure.

Conclusions: These recommendations offer PEP guidance for bloodborne pathogens and are limited in scope. These recommendations do not address general wound PEP such as tetanus or the need for antibiotics. It is hoped that these guidelines will fill an urgent gap in preparedness until definitive, comprehensive guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are published. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:106–109)

The ability to monitor assistance, define humanitarian needs, and approach equity in the distribution of assistance has lagged behind the world’s growing commitment to responding to humanitarian emergencies. This article highlights relevant data sources to elucidate elements of an operational definition of humanitarian need. New and refined measures are proposed to assist in assessing the level of need among affected populations. An original measure that combines data on conflict and disasters to summarize the cumulative magnitude of 4 types of humanitarian threats is presented. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:110–116)

Global public health surveillance is critical for the identification and prevention of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. The World Health Organization recently released revised International Health Regulations (IHR) that serve as global legislation and provide guidelines for surveillance systems. The IHR aim to identify and prevent spread of these infectious diseases; however, there are some practical challenges that limit the usability of these regulations. IHR requires Member States to build necessary infrastructure for global surveillance, which may not be possible in underdeveloped countries. A large degree of freedom is given to each individual government and therefore different levels of reporting are common, with substantial emphasis on passive reporting. The IHR need to be enforceable and enforced without impinging on government autonomy or human rights. Unstable governments and developing countries require increased assistance in setting up and maintaining surveillance systems. This article addresses some challenges and potential solutions to the ability of national governments to adhere to the global health surveillance requirements detailed in the IHR. The authors review some practical challenges such as inadequate surveillance and reporting infrastructure, and legal enforcement and maintenance of individual human rights. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:117–121)

Botulism is a neuroparalytic disease caused by neurotoxins produced by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum. Botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs) are among the most potent naturally occurring toxins and are a category A biological threat agent. The 7 toxin serotypes of BoNTs (serotypes A–G) have different toxicities, act through 3 different intracellular protein targets, and exhibit different durations of effect. Botulism may follow ingestion of food contaminated with BoNT, from toxin production of C botulinum present in the intestine or wounds, or from inhalation of aerosolized toxin. Intoxication classically presents as an acute, symmetrical, descending flaccid paralysis. Early diagnosis is important because antitoxin therapy is most effective when administered early. Confirmatory testing of botulism with BoNT assays or C botulinum cultures is time-consuming, and may be insensitive in the diagnosis of inhalational botulism and in as many as 32% of food-borne botulism cases. Therefore, the decision to initiate botulinum antitoxin therapy is primarily based on symptoms and physical examination findings that are consistent with botulism, with support of epidemiological history and electrophysiological testing. Modern clinical practice and antitoxin treatment has reduced botulism mortality rates from ∼60% to ≤10%. The pentavalent botulinum toxoid is an investigational product and has been used for more than 45 years in at-risk laboratory workers to protect against toxin serotypes A to E. Due to declining immunogenicity and potency of the pentavalent botulinum toxoid, novel vaccine candidates are being developed. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:122–134)

The incident command system provides an organizational structure at the agency, discipline, or jurisdiction level for effectively coordinating response and recovery efforts during most conventional disasters. This structure does not have the capacity or capability to manage the complexities of a large-scale health-related disaster, especially a pandemic, in which unprecedented decisions at every level (eg, surveillance, triage protocols, surge capacity, isolation, quarantine, health care staffing, deployment) are necessary to investigate, control, and prevent transmission of disease. Emerging concepts supporting a unified decision-making, coordination, and resource management system through a health-specific emergency operations center are addressed and the potential structure, function, roles, and responsibilities are described, including comparisons across countries with similar incident command systems. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:135–141)

Public health and the emergency care community must work together to effectively achieve a state of community-wide disaster preparedness. The identification of model communities with good working relationships between their emergency care community and public health agencies may provide useful information on establishing and strengthening relationships in other communities. Seven model communities were identified: Boston, Massachusetts; Clark County, Nevada; Eau Claire, Wisconsin; Erie County, New York; Louisville, Kentucky; Livingston County, New York; and Monroe County, New York. This article describes these communities and provides a summary of common findings. Specifically, we recommend that communities foster respectful working relationships between agency leaders, hold regular face-to-face meetings, educate each other on their expertise and roles during a disaster, develop response plans together, work together on a day-to-day basis, identify and encourage a leader to facilitate these relationships, and share resources. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2007;1:142–145)