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Full Concreteness and the Re-Materialization of Matter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

James K. Feibleman
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We have been going through a period in the philosophy of science in which it has been dominated by the theory of the dematerialization of matter. From Eddington in 1927 to Hanson in the present day, this theory, in one formulation or another, has been maintained. Its adherents suppose that matter upon examination can be resolved into mental constructs of every description, from organized sets of sense impressions to mathematical equations. The idealists are so dazzled by the conditions under which the mental recognition of the extra-mental world occurs that they end by doubting the genuineness of the extra-mental world. But there are reasons to suspect that the idealistic interpretation is not the correct one, and I shall attempt here to present (though not to prove) the counter position. The materialist considers the extra-mental world genuine, but, as we shall see, it is not simply the case of an old materialism confronted with new evidence by the idealists. There is evidence for a new materialism as well. Thus what we have perhaps is an ancient controversy under fresh guises, a new idealism confronted by a new materialism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Diogenes , Volume 15 , Issue 60 , December 1967 , pp. 51 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © 1967 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

References

1 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1958, p. 58.

2 W. Heisenberg, op. cit., p. 129.

3 "The principle of indeterminacy re-examined," Ratio, vol. III (1961), p. 133-151.

4 "Material Objects and the Reference of Signs," Synthese, XV (1964), pp. 424-35.

5 "Why should We study High-Energy Nuclear Physics?," Nature (1964), n. 204, pp. 421-425, esp. p. 422.

6 Hume, Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, XII, Part II.