In memory of Professor Louise Marcil, from the University of Montreal, who died prematurely in April 1995, this special issue of Dialogue is dedicated to Equality. In addition to presenting the various contributions, the Introduction traces the main strands of Louise Marcil's work on equality. The impressive corpus of her writings on the subject is characterized throughout by sensitivity to the historical and conceptual complexity of egalitarian theories and policies and by a depth of scholarship, the richness of which defies classification into traditional philosophical schools. Moreover, far from being merely abstract scholarship, this work was clearly intended to strengthen actual egalitarian social projects, to which Louise Marcil was passionately committed. The contributions to this special issue of Dialogue have been selected in large part to reflect the diversity and scholarly standards of Louise Marcil's approach to equality as well as its engaged spirit.

After a short personal testimony by Jean-Claude Guidon, from the University of Montreal, Charles Coutel presents Condorcet as an original thinker of democratic equality. Paule-Monique Vernes argues in favour of seeing Hegel as the first philosopher who, before Marx, engaged in an in-depth analysis of the contradictions of the Civil Society and denounced the inequalities stemming from liberalism. Roberto Miguelez discusses equality among participants as a formal condition for action coordination based on dialogue, which is crucial to the democratic model.

Brenda Baker addresses a current trend by governments to shift responsibility for social services to the family. Among the deficiencies in grounds for such policies, she argues, are that they reinforce gendered inequalities. In his article, Kai Nielsen stengthens pro-egalitarian dimensions of John Rawls's theories by articulating a more sophisticated criterion of “reasonableness” than is found in Rawls's work. Analogously, Maurice Rickard defends Ronald Dworkin's link between liberty and equality, but argues that Dworkin's justification for this is insufficient, requiring, instead, a defence in terms of personal autonomy.

Rencontre étonnante que cet extrait poétique tiré de l'œuvre de Stefan George et qui apparaît dans le livre que Raymond Klibansky a récemment publié avec Georges Leroux. On peut y voir une des références favorites de «Klib», le cher professeur de Louise; on peut aussi imaginer, sans trop rêver, que ces mots ont été récités devant elle, engendrant du même mouvement une résonance aussi douloureuse qu'inattendue. En un raccourci saisissant, ces quelques vers intolérablement sagaces résument en effet, avec toutes ses aspérités, le chemin qui conduit de la religion à la Raison. Louise a minutieusement, douloureusement, parcouru cette distance. Elle a vécu, à sa manière, une révolution tranquille.

This paper intends to focus on Condorcet's approach to the Principle of Equality. Condorcet, in effect, strenuously strives to counter the risks of equalitarianism, such as élitism. According to him, it is in the interest of the Republic and of public instruction to favour the diversity of talents and the spreading of enlightenment, since, in the end, it will benefit all citizens.

This article aims to show that, in the course of his analysis of Bourgeois Civil Society, Hegel formulates a philosophical theory of British society as it had been already described by A. Smith, and thereby anticipates our present “dual” societies which can be characterized by luxury and poverty. The Bourgeois Civil Society is seen as a necessary economical stage in the progressive satisfaction of social needs, but also as an insufficient one insofar as the abstract parallel sophistication of the needs themselves generates a plebeian class as a residue of the civil society which cannot be eliminated through colonial expansion. In Hegel's view, politics should remain in control of economics.

Language plays a crucial role in human forms of action coordination. This paper examines problems concerning the satisfaction of a major and complex condition of coordination of actions grounded in dialogue, i.e., equality of argumentative competence. It is, indeed, the satisfaction of this condition that defines the autonomy of the subjects participating in and committed to a dialogue situation. From a political point of view, this question can be examined as a problem of dialogical democracy. This paper proposes the autonomy of subjects as a major condition for the realization of such a political form.

The task of giving a philosophical account of moral judgements—both of the language used to express such judgements and of what must be in the mind and surrounding circumstances of the agent who makes them—has been high on the agenda of ethical theory for some time. David Copp proposes to take care of that item in this book. The result is a theory which, at the analytic level, endorses cognitivism, realism, naturalism, relativism, and motivational externalism. At the normative level, it is perhaps closest to rule utilitarianism, though it does not strictly conform to any of the usual definitions. The book moves always at the level of theory, without taking up applications to real moral issues, though it is easy to see how there might be such applications.

Despite the diversity and important disagreement which characterizes theorizing in political philosophy, most contemporary theories of justice yield remarkably similar verdicts on the moral adequacy of current distributions of wealth, income, and opportunity. By almost any standard of justice defended today, we live in a profoundly unjust world. It is obvious, for instance, that utilitarianism, the difference principle, equality of resources, and even modest-sounding principles of equality of opportunity all condemn the yawning gulf which separates the rich and the poor of the world. Even Nozick's recommendation that the difference principle be used as a rough principle for rectifying historical injustice indicates how little immediate practical difference there is between Rawls's theory and its supposed libertarian antithesis. All this suggests that there is a surprising theoretical consensus about the immediate practical demands of justice. In short, moving toward justice requires substantially reducing the dramatic inequalities which plague our world.

From Gillian Brock's vigorous probing (Brock 1994, 1996) of my treatment of meeting needs in my book of that title (Braybrooke 1987) I have learned a good deal; and from the article published in Dialogue, which concerns in particular the connection that I made between justice and needs, I have certainly learned how my arguments for that connection might have been expressed more cogently. Yet I think that the arguments I intended, and even the arguments I expressed, escape her criticisms. She quotes a number of leading assertions drawn one by one from my text, but consolidates into one argument what are best regarded as three different, though connected, arguments, to the disadvantage of their respective strengths. She also disregards, to their disadvantage, the distinction between “respect for a person M's position”—my phrasing, meaning M's position under some assignment of benefits and burdens—and “respect for a person M”—a notion that does not come into the three arguments.