One result of the protracted and inconclusive contemporarydebate over the merits of a materialist theory of mind is that philosophers have been prompted to explore new and credible alternative theories. Campbell's “new epiphenomenalism” is one of these, and Goldman's conception of mental and physical events as “simultaneous nomic equivalents” is another. After a brief introductory discussion of materialism, I shall examine and assess these views. My path leads back, tentatively, to materialism, via a critical look at the main reasons given by Campbell and Goldman for abandoning it.

A teacher announces to his students that he intends to give them a surprise examination. That is, on one of the next five (let us say) days he will give them an examination and they will not know which particular day it will be. He wants it to be a surprise, and so if on the morning of the examination the students can display knowledge that it will be that day he will cancel the examination. A bright student claims that the examination is impossible. Clearly it cannot be saved for the last day, for there would certainly be no surprise then. But similarly it cannot be given on the second last day, because if it was not given on the first three days, then on the morning of the fourth day the students, knowing that it cannot be given on the last day, would be able to predict that it must be the fourth day and so there is no surprise. And so on. At which point the teacher either forgets about the examination, or else, perhaps more wisely, goes on with his plan to have a surprise examination and succeeds.

Cet article veut présenter une approche épistémologique assez différente de celles qui sont les plus répandues aujourd'hui. Une approche moins formelle, sans doute plus phénoménologique. On s'apercevra qu'elle ne vient pas en contradiction avec ces épistémologies plus formelles, mais qu'elle permet un debut de reponse aux questions ou objections que plusieurs se posent au sujet de la portee cognitive des théories scientifiques. Wittgenstein, par exemple, s'est montre fort insatisfait des explications «illusoires» des sciences (Tract., 6.371–2), alors que plusieurs de nos contemporains se detournent de ce mode de connaissance, jugé trop formel et vide.

Cet article a pour but de faire connaître au lecture une approche théorique de la réalité physique différente de celle communément admise depuis les débuts de la science physique. On y montre d'abord comment l'approche traditionnelle traite avec une notion de l'événement physique et des étres physiques en ǵenéral qui laisse systématiquement de côté ces éléments de complexité considérés trop facilement comme superflus, mais qui appartiennent à la réalité physique et en constituent la trame. On proposera alors une nouvelle approche qui s'avérera complémentaire de l'approche traditionnelle, en mettant en jeu la notion d'événement singulier, caractérisé par son unicité dans l'espace-temps tout comme un fait historique muni de toute sa richesse factuelle qui est la base de son individualité.

Pour notre excuse, Quine est un auteur difficile. Si la version française de Word and Object (en abrégé WO), annoncée chez Payot, est correcte, elle rendra service, car il est malaisé de lire Quine dans le texte.

Sila philosophie de Jean-Jacques Rousseau connaît un regain devie par l'actualité de ses thèmes et par ses nombreuses affinités avec la conscience contemporaine, la littérature rousseauiste récente témoigne bien pour sa part de l'attrait qu'exerce sur les philosophes la pensée de Jean-Jacques.

Most books defending the position now know as “libertarianism”, the thesis that government ought to confine itself only to the most minimal functions of preventing or punishing force and fraud, can be dismissed with little scruple as the work of cranks. And some have already done so with this one as well: but wrongly. It is clearly the work of a person of extraordinary brilliance, penetration, and learning, possessed of a pungent style and an uncommon flair for paradox and counterexample. Those who are inclined to reject it out of hand because its conclusions will seem incredible might also bear in mind that its author is a man to whom his colleague John Rawls (whose conclusions do seem very credible to many) has expressed gratitude and indebtedness. At any rate, I propose to take the work with complete seriousness. And after all, should there not be considerable attraction i n the view that the only enforceable duty is that of respecting the freedom of our fellows as completely as possible? Surely it behooves us to see just why this will not do, if it won't; and no better opportunity for examining the view has arisen than that provided by the publication of this book.

This volume is the record of a symposium on the structer of scientific theories held in urbana, Illinois in the spring of 1969. ofSeven main papers (though two are represented in this volume by “summary-abstracts”), commentaries, discussions, and a postscript form the bulk of the book. The rest is a nearly 240-page monograph-in-the-guise-of-an-introduction by the editor titled “The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories”.