Une théorie davidsonienne de la signification pour une langue L prend la forme d'une theorie tarskienne (réecursive et vraie) de la véeritée-dans-L. Une telle théeorie sera absolument radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne, c'est-à-dire conforme à la convention T de Tarski (1931), en n'utilisant que des donnéees empiriques dont la description ne fait intervenir aucun concept linguistique (tels que ceux de synonymie, d'analyticitée, de signification, etc.), tandis qu'elle sera relativement radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne en n'utilisant que des donnéees empiriques dont la description ne fait intervenir aucun concept linguistique propre à L (tels que ceux de synonymie-dans-L, d'analyticitée-dans-L, etc.).

In §6 of Book 1, Part 4 of the Treatise, Hume appears to be inconsistent in his comments about ascriptions of identity to series of successive, significantly related items or to purported single things whose temporal stages are qualitatively different or temporally discontinuous. For example, in the first few pages of §6, Hume explicitly labels such ascriptions “mistakes” and “confusions” (THN, 1. 4. §6, 253–254). Later on in the same section, however, he deals with the alleged identity-preservation of minds, churches, rivers, and so forth and no longer remarks that these attributions of identity are confused or mistaken. Hume claims that the idea of identity is the idea of an item which is (1) invariable, i.e., serially uniform, and (2) uninterrupted, i.e., temporally continuous, which seems to last through time (THN, 1. 4. §2, 200–201; 1. 4. §6, 253). Thus, on page 255 he states that “identity” is used “in an improper sense” if attributed to a series of related items which are either different in kind or temporally discontinuous, viz., to a purported identity-preserving thing whose temporal stages are different in kind or temporally discontinuous. Yet, on page 258, he comments that calling a church which has been rebuilt of different materials and in a different architectural style the same church as the former one can be done “without breach of the propriety of language”. Presumably, this use of “same” is a proper sense of “same”.

In discussing the relation between miracles and the laws of nature, it is important to make clear what one means when one employs the terms “miracle” and “law of nature”. This is essential, since both terms may be used in a number of different ways. I wish to begin, therefore, by briefly indicating how I shall use these terms. I shall then be in a position t o discuss the relation between these particular concepts of miracles and the laws of nature.

Un monde nouveau apparaît avec la dialectique platonicienne, qui brise l'harmonie native de la pensée archaïque et sa rayonnante unité, pour opposer désormais le royaume invisible des Formes dont lâme conserve, en une tonalité mineure, la nostalgie, et le troublant exil des corps, livrés aux désirs ehatoyants des simulacres. Issue d'une disso-nance aussi radicale, la philosophie s'épuisera au cours de son histoire à tenter de combler le χωρισμóς pour se résoudre en un accord parfait. Cette interprétation communément reçue du platonisme, qui prédispose à l'idéalisme comme au christianisme, commande encore les lectures critiques de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, mais tient déjà tout entière dans la fresque de Raphaël: représenté près d'Aristote dont la main, largement ouverte, impose sa maîtrise à la terre, l'auteur du Timée montre, d'un doigt impératif, la direction du ciel.

In common with most, if not all, commentato?s on Hume's Treatise, Book 1, Part 4, §2, “Of scepticism with regard to the senses”, I consider his reasoning in places to be unsound and his claims to be inconsistent. In that section Hume is conce?ned with the question of how we come to believe in the existence of material objects having a continuous existence independently of ou? perceiving them. Since, in his more tough-minded moments, he takes it that the only perceptual data with which we can ever have acquaintance consists of fleeting impressions which are dependent on our having them, he f?nds himself led to the bleak and implausible conclusion that the existence of material objects is a fiction, and the belief something into which we are seduced by the imagination.

Voici deux heureuses initiatives que nous devons à des universitaires canadiens qui n'en sont pas à leurs premiéres armes. Selon toute apparence la conception de ces anthologies ne découle pas d'une planification entre les deux auteurs. Pourtant elles se complètent remarquablement bien, et ce sur plus d'un plan.

1) Leur complémentarité réside tout d'abord dans le choix des problématiques respectives. Bien que les deux auteurs manifestent un même souci pour des problemès contemporains majeurs en matière d'ethique, ils ne se recoupent que quatre fois sur les neuf chapitres contenus dans chaque livre, notamment à propos des questions concernant ravortement, l'euthanasie, lapeine capitale et la sexualité, encore que les textes choisis par Wesley Cragg (W.C.) situent l'euthanasie (involontaire) plutôt dans la perspective de l'infanticide, tandis que ceux retenus par Jan Narveson (J. N.) la discutent du point de vue de l'adulte, rapprochant l'euthanasie volontaire du suicide; la sexualité est abordée par le premier à travers les débats sur la pornographie et la censure, tandis que J.N. la situe dans l'optique de l'érotisme, de l'adultère et des conditions anthropologiques. Quant aux autres problématiques, les auteurs divergent dans leurs choix.

For several years philosophy departments across this continent have offered undergraduate philosophy courses designed to acquaint students with philosophical techniques and fundamental ethical theories in the context of concrete moral problems. These “applied ethics” courses go by various names: “Contemporary Moral Issues”, “Practical Ethics”, “Social Ethics”, “Issues in Applied Ethics”, “Current Moral and Legal Problems”, “Moral Philosophy and Medicine”, “Biomedical Ethics”, and so on. I have taught several versions of applied ethics courses many times and have always enjoyed them. Typically they are popular courses, drawing students from many disciplines and backgrounds, most of whom have never taken philosophy before. The range of possible “applied ethics” topics available is limited only by the instructor's imagination, although there is a fascination for the thanatological—hence the pride of place usually given to discussions of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, world starvation, war, and capital punishment.

Angel's declared purpose is to “demystify” mysticism by approaching it as we do ordinary phenomena, and his eventual conclusion is that mystical experiences are very similar to some of our everyday experiences. To demonstrate that, he provides us with three closely-argued chapters on, successively, the typology of mysticism, the reasons for mystical silence, and the relationship of mysticism to other experiences. Ultimately, he claims that mysticism need not be mysterious because all of us have quasi-mystical experiences (81).

In The Moral Mystic James Home has written a sequel to his Beyond Mysticism, where he ably explored a variety of philosophical issues arising from mysticism. This time his study has a special focus, and he makes an important contribution to the ongoing philosophical discussion of relations between religion and morality. As Home notes, “There is a very wide consensus in the philosophic world that religion and morality are independent of each other and that we can produce reliable moral judgments independently, with no need for religious guidance” (95). Home agrees that a non-religious morality is a reasonable option, but he claims that a religious commitment and perspective can sometimes intelligibly and legitimately affect an agent's morality. He supports this claim, not by an abstract argument, but by a descriptive analysis of the reflective process which goes on in a particular kind of religious person whom he calls the “moral mystic”. Why appeal to mysticism to show that religion can be positively and rationally relevant to morality? Such an appeal is initially implausible, for philosophers and others have severely criticized mystics for being amoral and perhaps even immoral. Home begins his book with a summary of such criticisms, but he claims that they apply to “pure” mystics rather than to his moral mystics. This distinction between mystics is crucial for his thesis.

Although Donald Evans and I argue for similar forms of life, he emphasizes non-egoism in mystical morality and I stress its personal character. In addition, we differ on whether the scholar of mysticism should commit himself to its actual practice. Our basic agreement is partly evinced in his succinct ten-point characterization of my concepts of the “moral mystic”, and “proper-name morality”. Evans clarifies my presentation and implicitly challenges me to attempt further development of my ideas.