Errol Harris talks about a crypto-dialectic method that lies behind the geometrical disguise of Spinoza's Ethics. Spinoza's method, he argues, is not the linear formal deduction of traditional logic but a crypto-dialectical development of the structural implications of a systematic whole. Substance differentiates itself into infinite attributes and infinite modes. Each attribute is self-differentiated into a hierarchy of modes ranging from the most complex to the simplest. Harris calls this a dialectical scale or a crypto-dialectical development of the structural implications of a systematic whole. The self-specification of the whole into attributes and modes provides the framework for a dialectical system. Spinoza's hypotheses (propositions) are implications dialectically derived from his concept of substance, a concept of a whole which differentiates itself into infinite attributes and modes. Substance is not a hypothesis but is a postulate which s i absolutely certain. Everything follows from substance with dialectical necessity. Substance is the origin of all things and ideas.

À l'occasion de la tenue à Paris des Conférences Jean-Nicod de philoso-phie cognitive dont il a été le premier invité au printemps 1993, Jerry Fodor a présenté le dernier état de la théorie qu'il défend en philosophie de l'esprit1. Cette théorie se fonde sur trois théses sur la signification et l'esprit qui, prises séparément, semblent chacune dotée d'une certaine plausibilité, mais dont la cohérence mutuelle apparaît sujette à caution. L'objet des conférences données par Fodor était de montrer que, contrai-rement aux apparences, ces trois doctrines peuvent être conciliées. Toute-fois, de l'aveu même de Fodor, une telle conciliation n'est pas sans avoir un coût. II concéde notamment que sa stratégic de conciliation impose une revision du statut de certains phénoménes traditionnellement considérés comme des explananda pour une psychologie intentionnelle. II soutient cependant que le coût de cette opération reste raisonnable puisque les phé-noménes écartés sont de toute fa§on des phénoménes rares et marginaux.

My project is to assess recent objections directed at Jürgen Habermas by Nancy Fraser, Iris Young and Seyla Benhabib. This dispute is significant because it concerns the value of the Enlightenment style, detached criticism promoted by Habermas as compared to new proposals about dissent from a stance connected to social movements. I argue that these feminist criticisms of Habermas's critical theory are compelling and that they require substantial changes in Habermas's thinking.

Lawrence H. Davis (1977, 1985) has formulated and defended a version of the argument from symmetry for the non-iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that attempts to show that under certain conditions the rationally prescribed course of action in this game is co-operation. The argument runs as follows below. (I have prefixed a ‘D’ to each of Davis's numbers here, and in subsequent references, in order to avoid confusion as I refer to his points.)

Is game theory good for us? This may seem an odd question. In the strict sense, game theory—the axiomatic account of interaction between rational agents—is as morally neutral as arithmetic. But the popularization of game theory as a way of thinking about social interaction is far from neutral. Consider the contrast between characterizing bargaining over distribution as a “zero-sum society” and focussing on “win-win” cooperative solutions. These reflections bring us to the book under review, Prisoner's Dilemma, a popular introduction to game theory and its relation to ethics by the respected science writer William Poundstone. The book begins with a moral dilemma and ends by discussing the evolution of co-operation. Poundstone emphasizes—correctly, to my mind—the ethical potential of game theory. He concludes his first chapter with this striking claim: “Today's practitioners of game theory are attempting to forge a kind of ethical progress. Is there any way to promote the common good in a prisoner's dilemma? The attempt to answer this question is one of the great intellectual adventures of our time” (p. 9).

Commençons par saluer la parution de cet ouvrage, qui propose au lecteur francophone les traductions de quatorze articles de Hintikka (dont deux écrits en collaboration avec G. Sandu), couvrant la période 1976-1990, qu'on peut pour l'essentiel répartir en deux rubriques; les six premiers articles constituent à des titres divers un plaidoyer pour l'introduction d'un nouveau cadre conceptuel, ou «paradigme», en linguistique, destiné à rem-placer le programme de la grammaire générative, et capable (selon l'auteur) d'expliquer et de prédire un grand nombre de phénomènes linguistiques plus ou moins négligés par l'approche traditionnelle, liée au pré-jugé selon lequel la créativité du langage est essentiellement d'ordre récursif. La seconde partie du recueil a pour thème central les limites de la logique du premier ordre (théorie de la quantification), et esquisse ce que devrait être une logique du premier ordre plus générate, en ce qu'elle accueille dans ses notations des phénoménes d'independance relative des quantificateurs et des connecteurs (Independence-friendly Logic, en abrégé IF). Á travers les deux révolutions dans la pensée qui sont ainsi proposées, Hintikka développe (et c'est ce qui fait l'unité profonde de l'ouvrage) les conséquences proches et lointaines de la sémantique qu'il a introduite dans les années 1970 (Hintikka, 1973), et initialement appliquée á la logique du premier ordre, sémantique fondée sur l'utilisation de concepts de la théorie des jeux (Game-theoretical Semantics, en abrégé GTS). Quels que soient par ailleurs ses grands mérites, la traduction française ici utilisée par N. Lavand, «sémantique des jeux», voile plus qu'elle ne révèle les rapports exacts entre la théorie mathématique desjeux, les langages, naturels ou formalisés, pour lesquels on construit une sémantique dite «formelle», et les concepts de stratégic et d'information, en particulier, tirés précisément de l a théorie des jeux et appliqués á l'interprétation du vocabulaire logique de ces langages. II est vrai qu'il y a lá une difficulté de traduction.

Is the endeavour to probe the meaning of modernity other than a form of self-obsession, a kind of collective and conceptual narcissism, characteristic of the perhaps peculiarly modern preoccupation with abstract notions and inwardness? And whatever the motivation and origin, is the endeavour likely to issue in something better than doubtful or empty pronouncements, true to the extent that they are platitudes and false or obscure for the rest? Encountering the title Modernism as a Philosophical Problem one can imagine a Rortyean reading: modernism a philosophical problem?—and the commentary: well, if you think that, you do have a problem, namely, philosophical pretentiousness and an affliction for foundations, for ultimate principles that, if truly ultimate, are unattainable and also unnecessary. In a different voice, a similar cynicism can be heard, the Lyotardean lament at the announcement of yet another unneeded philosophical meta-narrative, a new, idle tale about history, ideas and development, culminating in grand notions confounded by facts.

Group rights have long been of special concern to Canadians. Quebec has maintained a distinct language and civil law system, and Canada's Aboriginal Peoples have always had (“enjoyed” is perhaps the wrong word here) different legal rights from those of other Canadians. Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sought to reduce the significance of these special protections. He argued that they were the product of historical compromise and political wrangling rather than of any principled vision ofjustice. As a result, he opposed any special status for Quebec in favour of nationwide bilingualism, and sought to dismantle the reserve system for the First Nations. He sought to replace both with the idea of universal citizenship.

En ce cinquième centenaire de la mort de Jean Pic de la Mirandole, il peut être pertinent de présenter quatre ouvrages récents ayant trait à l'œuvre du Mirandolien. Trois d'entre eux présentent des traductions, qui en partie se recoupent, en partie sont complémentaires, et qu'il est intéressant de comparer entre elles de facon analytique et critique. Le quatrième ouvrage propose un vaste exposé systématique de l'œuvre de Jean Pic. Vu son ampleur, il mérite d'être considéré séparément des trois autres.

Annette Baier should have entitled her book A Progress of Reason and Sentiments instead of A Progress of Sentiments, because one of her chief concerns is the role and significance of reason in Hume's philosophy. She says in the Preface that her aim in the book is “to present Hume's work as exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiment, and acquiring ‘new force as it advances‘” (p. viii). Because the issue of reason in Hume's philosophy is central to her concern, Baier initiates a discussion of it in Chapter 1 and relentlessly pursues the discussion throughout the book. I think it is fair to say that Baier wishes to answer the question “How, if at all, does cognitive reason function in Hume's philosophy?” To answer this question she begins by contrasting Hume's method of conducting philosophy with the method of the Cartesian or intellectualist tradition. She shows that solipsism is, to borrow Gilbert Ryle's expression, the “ineluctable destiny” of the kind of philosopher who glorifies the intellect while denigrating the other human capacities, the individual who indulges in abstract speculation over practical matters. According to Baier, this solipsistic predicament i s what Hume's protagonist articulates towards the end of his intellectual adventure in Book I, Part IV of the Treatise in saying: “Where am I or what? From what causes do I derive my existence?…” Here, Baier affirms, is pure (read unsociable) reason trapped in a miasma of self-doubt, perplexities, bewilderment and desolation from which it cannot extricate itself.

Aristotelian notions such as matter, form and substance (or object) should be used carefully; not only is the rich tradition in their background marked by variety of interpretation, even Aristotle's own use of these concepts is far from uniform. In his different works, matter, form and (primary) substance display contents that do not always agree. There is reason for believing that in the Metaphysics Zeta the notion of form embodies (or amounts to) essence, and that accordingly something without essence does not qualify as substance. This cannot be generalized or regarded as Aristotle's standard view, however, for in the Physics there are contexts in which the form is not conceived as (or does not embody) essence. There, “the form or shape” is the arrangement of the substance's parts, or the object's shape, in addition to either all or some of its qualities (i.e., the sensible shape). Outside the Metaphysics, substance, too, seems to be a less distinguished entity. In the Physics, and especially in the Categories, substance is anything capable of independent existence, any particular concrete thing that is a bearer of attributes. To the extent that our modern “object” corresponds to Aristotle's primary substance, it has a similar polysemy. While in some contexts it will mean an articulated object belonging to a specific kind, in others it will denote bodies without organized structure, that is, it will have as extension the particular bits and pieces that fill the world. A similar diversity applies to matter. When understood, for example, as a chunk out of which an artist casts her statue, matter is an object (a substratum), a body, itself endowed with a boundary (a form) and a multitude of properties. But matter can be much simpler than that; it can be a plain homoeomere, a mere element, or as in prime matter, may lack every actual attribute. When in my “Matter and Objecthood” I criticized Henry Laycock's views propounded in “Some Questions of Ontology” I found comparable ambiguities transposed to contemporary discourse. In the paper just cited, Laycock examines the ontic status of matter, contrasting it with objects as particular concrete things; throughout his discussion no radical distinction is made between articulated objects and unorganized bodies. In my criticism I employed ‘object’ in the same inclusive sense.