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Why All Feminists Should Be Contractarians

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Susan Dimock
Susan Dimock
Affiliation:
York University
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Abstract

In this article I defend the view that all feminists should be contractarians. Indeed, I argue that feminists should be Hobbesian or rational-choice contractarians at that. The argument proceeds by critically examining some of the main reasons why feminists have been resistant or even hostile to contractarian moral theory, and showing that the criticisms are misguided against Hobbesian versions of the theory. I conclude with a brief positive argument to the effect that contractarianism provides a plausible explanation of what is wrong with patriarchy and so can serve as the theoretical basis for feminist ethics.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , Spring 2008 , pp. 273 - 290
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

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References

Notes

1 Rather than present the criticisms raised by any particular feminist against contractarianism, which can too easily be dismissed as taken out of context or otherwise as unrepresentative, I proceed by describing some general lines of criticism. I hope that they are sufficiently familiar as to be accepted as general lines of feminist critique. Among the feminist critiques of contractarianism that have most informed my thinking are Baier, Annette, “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?,” Nous, 19, 1 (1985): 53–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brennan, Samantha, “Recent Work on Feminist Theory,” Ethics, 109, 4 (1999): 858–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Held, Virginia, “Non-Contractual Society,” in Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory, edited by Hanen, M. and Nielson, K. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987), pp. 111–38Google Scholar, and Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)Google Scholar; the collection of essays edited by Held, Virginia, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995)Google Scholar; Okin, Susan, “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice,” Ethics, 99, 2 (1989): 229–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989)Google Scholar; Pateman, Carole, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Sample, Ruth, “Why Feminist Contractarianism?,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 33, 2 (2002): 257–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The principal exception to the feminist response to contractarianism was found in the work of Hampton, Jean: “Feminist Contractarianism,” in A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, edited by Antony, L. M. and Witt, C. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993): 227–55Google Scholar; “The Wisdom of the Egoist,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, 1 (1997): 21–51Google Scholar, and “Two Faces of Contractarian Thought,” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, edited by Danielson, P. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 31–55Google Scholar. Hampton develops a Kantian rather than a Hobbesian contractarian theory. See also Radzik, Linda, “Justice in the Family: A Defence of Feminist Contractarianism,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22, 1 (2005): 45–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wein, Sheldon, “Feminist Consciousness and Community Development,” International Journal of Social Economics, 24, 12 (1997): 1376–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 MacKinnon, Catharine, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

3 Cf. Gauthier, David, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 4.Google Scholar

4 Note that all that is required for moral standing on this view is that one be a potential partner to either market or cooperative interaction, and that one be rational. Thus, a happier effect of globalization than those usually discussed might be an expanding justification of the recognition of the rights of others. At the very least, contractarianism gives us the resources to say what is wrong not merely with overt coercion, force, and fraud in Western dealings in the developing world (something surely any adequate moral theory will do), but also what is wrong with various patterns of exploitation that fall short of overt coercion.

5 See Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961)Google Scholar; and Lewis, David, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

6 The word “constraint” is used often within contractarian theories, but it has the potential to mislead. It should not be taken to suggest that we want to violate the rights of others or interact with them in ways that worsen their situation, being restrained from doing so only by systems of morality and politics, as though we act morally just because we are somehow forced to do so. Rather, the notion of constraint refers to the need to modify our goal in certain interactive situations, so that instead of seeking our own maximal individual benefit we instead choose so as to achieve mutual benefit.

7 Gauthier, David, “Rational Constraint: Some Last Words,” in Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, edited by Vallentyne, Peter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 323–30, esp. p. 327.Google Scholar

8 See Gauthier, David, “In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor (Reflections on Rationality),” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 89 (1989): 179–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Gauthier, , “Rational Constraint,” p. 329.Google Scholar

10 I have defended the assumption of non-tuism in Dimock, Susan, “Defending Non-tuism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, 2 (06 1999): 251–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a contrary view, see Hubin, Donald C., “Non-tuism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21, 4 (12 1991): 441–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Radzik, , “Justice in the Family.”Google Scholar

11 Cf. Dworkin, Ronald, “Reverse Discrimination,” in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).Google Scholar

12 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (1651)Google Scholar, chap. 13.

13 Simone de Beauvoir's distinction between transcendence and immanence in The Second Sex may suggest that many of the activities involved in the private sphere are merely activities of immanence, which are ultimately futile and unfulfilling. If so, this is an important additional reason to think that a gendered division of labour, under which women are excluded from transcendent activities or bear a disproportionately large share of labours of immanence, would not be accepted by women. I do not see such an account as a competitor to contractarianism, rather than a supplement to it. I thank Andrea Veltman for reminding me of this point.

14 For details see Dimock, , “Defending Non-tuism.”Google Scholar

15 Hampton, , “Two Faces of Contractarian Thought,” p. 53Google Scholar. Cf. Hampton, “Feminist Contractarianism,”Google Scholar and Radzik, , “Justice in the Family.”Google Scholar

16 Gauthier, , Morals by Agreement, pp. 11 and 251.Google Scholar

17 Hobbes, , Leviathan (1651)Google Scholar, chap. 15, “The Science of these Lawes is the True Morall Philosophy.”

18 I am grateful to the participants of the IVR-CS annual meeting in June 2004 for comments on an earlier draft of this article, and particularly to Paul Viminitz, who provided a written commentary.