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Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part II: Identity in Reduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

C.A. Hooker
C.A. Hooker
Affiliation:
The University of Newcastle, Australia The University of Western Ontario
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Extract

Part I of this trilogy, Historical and Scientific Setting, set out a general context for selecting a certain subclass of inter-theoretic relations as achieving appropriate explanatory and ontological unification – hence for properly being labelled reductive. Something of the complexity of these relations in real science was explored. The present article concentrates on the role which identity plays in structuring the reduction relation and so in achieving ontological and explanatory unification.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 1981 , pp. 201 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1981

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References

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