1. Introduction
In the “introduction” of his recent article “Hegel's Truth and Gadamer's Method,” Daniel O. Dahlstrom summarizes scholars’ different ideas about the Hegel-Gadamer relationship (Dahlstrom, Reference Dahlstrom, George and van der Heiden2022, p. 232).Footnote 1 Most studies focus on explaining their similarities and clarifying their differences. Topics such as subjectivity, self-consciousness, reflection, language, dialogue, dialectic, infinity, finitude, etc. are more frequently discussed than others.Footnote 2 Generally, Hans-Georg Gadamer is critical of self-consciousness with its many forms of subjectivism. Although he holds that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy is beyond such subjectivism,Footnote 3 Gadamer also deems Hegel's philosophy as philosophy of subjectivity. For Gadamer, it is not Hegel's dialectic, but dialogue, not Hegel's concept, but language, that reveal the world experience of human beings. However, Gadamer also deems himself an inheritor of Hegel's thought, and he declares the “tension-filled proximity” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, p. 53) or “strained closeness” (spannungsvolle Nähe) (Risser, Reference Risser2002, p. 86) towards Hegel. In the contemporary philosophical context, Gadamer's self-description of his relationship with Hegel is typical, because indeed many post-Hegelian philosophers share this “tension-filled proximity” towards Hegel. In this article, I take the Hegel-Gadamer relationship as an example in order to defend the contemporary significance of Hegel's philosophy. My focus is to explain their differences using a discussion of Gadamer's criticisms of Hegel's subjectivity and dialectic, and then to reveal their “closeness.”
Hegel's philosophy, especially his theory of subjectivity, together with its dialectical method, faces many challenges. Since the 1960s, post-structuralism, post-modernism, and Frankfurt school's critical theory all have shown an anti-subjective tendency. “Anti-subjectivity” has become a philosophical “convention.” On the one hand, post-structuralists represented by Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, etc. have expressed doubts about the modern subject and subjectivity. They have such ideas as “the death of the subject” or “the death of man.”Footnote 4 On the other hand, post-modernists, represented by Jean-François Lyotard, regard subjectivity as the cause of “modern pathology” (Bowie, Reference Bowie2003, p. 13). Moreover, the critical theory of the Frankfurt school also has the anti-subjective tendency. For example, although Jürgen Habermas supports the rationality of Enlightenment and criticizes the anti-rational position, to some extent, he is supportive of the “anti-subjectivity” movement (Sherman, Reference Sherman2007). Hegel's thought on dialectic and concept faces no fewer controversies and difficulties. Karl Marx transforms Hegel's dialectic in a significant way. Benedetto Croce also criticizes a lot about Hegel's logic and dialectic in his What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel (Croce, Reference Croce and Ainslie1915, pp. 12, 56–57). Faced with these challenges, it is still an important question as to what kind of contemporary significance we may derive from Hegel's theory of subjectivity and his thought on dialectic and concept.
This article aims to elucidate the contemporary significance of Hegel's thought on subjectivity and dialectic by first involving Hegel and Gadamer in a dialogue, and then, by clarifying the characteristics of spirit — which is taken as an important subject — and the characteristics of concept in Hegel's philosophy. Section 2 expounds Gadamer's criticisms of Hegel's subjectivity and dialectic. Section 3 analyzes the “proximity” or “closeness” between Hegel and Gadamer. Section 4 defends the importance of Hegel's thought on spirit and concept through a detailed analysis of their characteristics. Finally, in Section 5, I conclude with two further comments about Hegel's absolute spirit and his concept.
2. Gadamer's Criticisms of Hegel's Subjectivity and Dialectic
The Hegel-Gadamer relationship is quite complex. The purpose of this section is to reveal their different philosophical positions by expounding Gadamer's criticisms of Hegel concerning subjectivity and dialectic. In criticism of Hegel's subjectivity, like many other post-Hegelian philosophers, Gadamer defends Hegel's objective spirit and opposes Hegel's absolute spirit. For Gadamer, Hegel's absolute spirit, which is a kind of infinite subjectivity, is a closed totality, allowing no further possibility. In criticism of Hegel's dialectic, Gadamer replaces it with dialogue, and replaces concept with language. Gadamer is also unsatisfied with Hegel's dialectical method because it brings the self and the other into a reconciliation. Moreover, for Gadamer, human experience is finite. Only through dialogue and language can the human experience be open.
2.1 Criticism of Hegel's Subjectivity
“Subjectivity” in Hegel's philosophy has multiple levels of meanings. What is relevant here is first the spirit. Hegel takes spirit as an important subject,Footnote 5 which manifests itself in individuals, communities, and the whole universe. It is subjective, objective, and absolute. However, in the ultimate sense, Hegel's subject is absolute spirit. It is not only the subjective self, but also the objective substance. Subject as absolute spirit is subject-substance or subject-object as a unity. Hegel claims in the “Preface” of Phenomenology of Spirit that “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject”Footnote 6 (Hegel, Reference Hegel and Miller1977, pp. 9–10). Hegel opposes both an unmoved substance and an empty subject, the latter being characteristic of the modern consciousness, the effect of which is subjectivism.
With the similar purpose of criticizing the modern subjectivist tendency, many post-Hegelian philosophers have inherited Hegel's thought on the objective spirit. For example, Wilhelm Dilthey takes the objective spirit as the absolute spirit or above the absolute spirit. He extends the objective spirit to encompass “every form of life” and subsumes the forms of absolute spirit (art, religion, and philosophy) under it (Dahlstrom, Reference Dahlstrom, George and van der Heiden2022, pp. 236–237). Dilthey replaces Hegel's absolute knowing with historical consciousness and claims a kind of objective knowledge.Footnote 7 However, Dilthey's approach is challenged by Gadamer. “We may ask how this claim can be justified without implying a concept of absolute, philosophical knowledge beyond all historical consciousness” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 228). In Gadamer's mind, historical knowledge without the guarantee of the absolute, philosophical knowledge may result in relativism (Dahlstrom, Reference Dahlstrom, George and van der Heiden2022, pp. 237–238).
Although Gadamer criticizes Dilthey, he similarly appropriates Hegel's objective spirit and criticizes Hegel's absolute spirit and absolute knowledge. For Gadamer, Hegel's absolute spirit, whose nature is the infinite subjectivity, is a closed totality, allowing no further possibility. Gadamer praises Hegel's effort in overcoming “the primacy of self-consciousness” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Hahn1997, p. 27), thus, to a certain extent, overcoming modern subjectivism. However, Gadamer thinks that Hegel does not get rid of subjectivism completely (Pippin, Reference Pippin2005, p. 83). Especially, when Gadamer takes Hegel's absolute as a totality and as a completion of the spirit's self-knowledge, he means that Hegel's spirit has come to an end and the totality is a closure. Thus, in Gadamer's mind, Hegel's spirit as subject is completely satisfied at last since it reaches the absolute or the infinite. But, for Gadamer, there is no such end. Spirit moves and is always moving. For example, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics hold that understanding the tradition is a process that will never end.Footnote 8
Related to the criticism of Hegel's absolute spirit, Gadamer deems Hegel's ontology as a kind of theology. Hegel, just like the Greek philosophers, takes “the being of beings” as “a being that fulfilled itself in thought” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 453). Hegel makes such hints. For example, he takes the content of logic as “the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit” (Hegel, Reference Hegel and di Giovanni2010b, p. 29). In his Lectures on the Proofs for the Existence of God, Hegel even considers the knowledge of human beings towards God as God's knowledge of himself, which also equals human beings’ self-knowledgeFootnote 9 (Hegel, Reference Hegel and Hodgson2007, p. 126), and which is also one source of the self-transparency of spirit's knowledge. But, for post-Hegelian philosophers, especially due to the distinction between the divine and the humane, the infinite and the finite, the above thought of Hegel is challenged more and more. This is also one reason that Gadamer criticizes Hegel's infinite or absolute spirit.
In criticism of Hegel's absolute subjectivity, Gadamer also opposes the complete self-transparency of spirit. Following Martin Heidegger and opposed to Hegel's infinite subject, Gadamer emphasizes “the radical finitude”Footnote 10 (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 467). For him, human beings are finite. He even derives the finitude from Hegel's concept of “the cunning of reason (List der Vernunft)” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, p. 46). The fact that even the historical heroes cannot control their own fate is a good demonstration of the finitude of human existence. Due to the finitude and limitation, there is no possibility to arrive at the absolute truth or self-transparent knowledge. Instead, Gadamer emphasizes “the finitude of our historical experience” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 453). Like Heidegger, Gadamer also holds that the truth of being is both unconcealing and concealing, which is in opposition to Hegel's understanding of self-transparent absolute knowledge.Footnote 11
In Gadamer's understanding, Hegel's attributing everything to absolute spirit or making the absolute as the reason for everything prevents the openness of experience.Footnote 12 For Gadamer, the human experience is finite and can never be concluded. Nor can it be reduced to absolute knowledge. An experienced person knows the limitedness of his experience and is thus open to more experience. Gadamer takes encountering with the tradition or the other as an important way to gain experience, and the mediation between the past and the present is always open rather than closed or finished.Footnote 13
Gadamer speaks highly of Hegel's objective spirit. This can be demonstrated by Gadamer's emphasis on the “cultural formation,” the characteristics of which he derives mainly from Hegel's philosophy.Footnote 14 Gadamer achieves his criticism on the subjectivist tendency of artistic taste embodied in Immanuel Kant's aesthetics by drawing inspiration from Hegel's account of the ontology of art. Gadamer makes it clear in Truth and Method:
Admittedly, Hegel was able to recognize the truth of art only by subordinating it to philosophy's comprehensive knowledge and by constructing the history of worldviews, like world history and the history of philosophy, from the viewpoint of the present's complete self-consciousness. But this cannot be regarded simply as a wrong turn, for the sphere of subjective mind has been far exceeded. Hegel's move beyond it remains a lasting element of truth in his thought. (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 85)
From the above quotes, it can be seen that Hegel's overcoming of modern subjectivism has left a significant impact on Gadamer's thinking. Although Gadamer is unsatisfied with Hegel's “complete self-consciousness,” he nonetheless relies on the objective side of Hegel's thought and treats it as “a lasting element of truth in his [Hegel's] thought” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 85).
In contemporary Hegelian studies, the objective spirit is more favoured. Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, and Robert Brandom (to name a few) all elucidate their philosophical claims and principles based on Hegel's objective spirit, not to mention the world-wide Marxist studies. The objective spirit directly concerns history, society, politics, and morality, and thus seems more real and tangible and more relevant to everyday individual and communal life. The forms of absolute spirit are art, religion, and philosophy. These are the fields that are more abstract, more metaphysical, more spiritual, and more belonging to the superstructure. For some people, these fields are not as relevant to everyday life. In fact, Hegel has already mentioned people's doubt towards philosophy, especially towards logic. Sometimes, people learn logic and that way of thinking, but after that, most people remain as they were (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 49). And worse still, the study of logic may even bring some unwanted results. “Through thinking, the positive state of affairs was deprived of its power” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 50). It may even threaten the status quo of the objective life. Therefore, Hegel is fully aware of the difficulties of logic. They are quite similar to the criticisms that absolute spirit and absolute knowledge face in our time.
In short, Gadamer praises Hegel for overcoming the subjectivist tendency in modern philosophy and for establishing the objective dimension. But, like many other post-Hegelian philosophers, Gadamer stops at the gate of absolute spirit. He deems that absolute spirit, whose nature is infinite subjectivity, is a closed totality. He also holds that absolute knowledge is completely self-transparent. Instead, Gadamer speaks highly of Hegel's objective spirit and maintains the finitude of human experience. Gadamer's criticism of Hegel's subjectivity is representative of later philosophers, who are also unsatisfied with Hegel's absolute. The Hegel-Gadamer relationship is a good example for further revealing Hegel's contemporary relevance.
2.2 Criticism of Hegel's Dialectic
Hegel's dialectic is closely related to his theory of subjectivity. “Dialectic” is a word that describes how the subject moves, develops, and determines itself. Generally speaking, with this dialectical way of development, the subject first comes out of itself, then finds itself in its other, and finally overcomes the alienation [Entfremdung],Footnote 15 thus returning to itself. Through this process, the subject renews itself constantly. For Hegel, everything develops dialectically, whether it be spirit or concept.
Gadamer's treatment of Hegel's dialectic is complex. Importantly, Gadamer tries to replace Hegel's dialectic with dialogue. Gadamer takes Hegel's dialectic to be a method, which he believes to be under the influence of René Descartes.Footnote 16 For Gadamer, Hegel's emphasis on “science” and “methodology” is quite similar to the modern self-consciousness.Footnote 17 Gadamer is more on side with the ancient Greek dialectic, represented by Plato and Socrates.Footnote 18 Following them, Gadamer considers dialectic to be a process of live conversation, of questions and answers, rather than the logical science where concept determines itself and comprises a whole system.Footnote 19
Gadamer is particularly unsatisfied with Hegel's system of concepts. “The systematic derivation of pure concepts in the Science of Logic, in which spirit has attained ‘the pure element of its existence, i.e., the concept,’ subsequently determines the system of science as a whole” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Smith1976, p. 79). In Gadamer's opinion, Hegel's exposition of thought through concepts takes “Plato's unending discussion of the soul with itself” only as “a formal model” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Smith1976, p. 79). However, it is exactly “Plato's unending discussion of the soul with itself” that Gadamer considers as the hermeneutic dialogue. By replacing Hegel's dialectic with dialogue, Gadamer attempts to retrieve dialectic in hermeneutics (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Smith1976, p. 99).
For Gadamer, Hegel's self-determination of concepts is limited. Gadamer regards Hegel's dialectic as “a monologue of thinking that tries to carry out in advance what matures little by little in every genuine dialogue” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 363). Gadamer admits the similarity between Hegel and the Greek metaphysics: both consider knowledge to be part of being, and take being as the basis for thinking and knowing. However, Gadamer also holds that Hegel replaces the “natural element” in Greek thought with “forms of knowing,” and with a system of concepts (Dahlstrom, Reference Dahlstrom, George and van der Heiden2022, p. 240). For Gadamer, concepts are like the skeleton of the flesh, while the “natural element” is more concrete and livelier than the concepts. Thus, the dialectic in Hegel's logic is not the live dialogue and conversation carried out by the ancients. For Gadamer, although Hegel opposes abstract concepts, the dialectical and logical development of concepts are no less abstract than what he has criticized.
Moreover, for Gadamer, it is language rather than concept that plays a vital role in our experience of the world. Gadamer believes that Hegel does not give language enough attention. In Hegel's dialectic, language is a kind of assertion and statement.Footnote 20 Language is for the game of thoughts and concepts. But, for Gadamer, “the dialogical character of language” is an important way to overcome “the subjectivity of self-consciousness” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, p. 56). Language is the medium where experience of the world occurs. “[W]e followed the trail of language, in which the structure of being is not simply reflected; rather, in language the order and structure of our experience itself is originally formed and constantly changed” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 453). Language enables understanding and constitutes the meaning of the world experience. In Gadamer's mind, our experience of the world is language-based, i.e., linguistic. There is no such an “object” as the world before the hermeneutical consciousness because both the world and consciousness are linguistic.
Furthermore, for Gadamer, dialectic and concepts conceal the being of things, and only through dialogue and hermeneutic language does the meaning of things reveal itself to us. Gadamer considers concepts to be the determination of the historical life of being, and concepts are the self-alienation of the living spirit. “The concepts in which thinking is formulated stand silhouetted like dark shadows on a wall” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Hahn1997, p. 35). In Gadamer's mind, it is language that enables the logical concepts, and the latter only express part of the live experience that is language-mediated.Footnote 21 Also, the meaning of things is multiple. Each time, only one certain aspect is revealed or said. There is always something “unsaid.” So, what we see through concepts is also one-sided and blind. This one-sidedness and blindness cannot be eliminated through Hegel's dialectic, but only through dialogue and the event of language.
Moreover, Gadamer criticizes Hegel's dialectic because it integrates the other into the self. With dialectic, for Hegel, the reconciliation in the spirit is important. Spirit estranges itself and returns to itself from its other, in which process the spirit also gains its self-consciousness and self-knowledge, elevating its individuality to universality. It is also the process of Hegel's Bildung Footnote 22 or cultural formation (Dahlstrom, Reference Dahlstrom, George and van der Heiden2022, p. 233). However, this process is generally considered as achieving an identity of the self and the other, which in Gadamer's understanding is the result of the dialectical development of spirit as subject, and which indicates totality and completeness of the dialectical process. As is understood by Gadamer, Hegel's cultural formation does not lie so much in the alienation as in “the return to oneself — which presupposes alienation, to be sure” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 13). This is where Gadamer differs from Hegel. For Gadamer, “the other” should not be integrated to “the self.” On understanding tradition, Gadamer opposes Friedrich Schleiermacher's restoration of the past, and he acknowledges Hegel's “thoughtful mediation” of the past and the present (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 161). For him and for Hegel, each such “mediation” is an elevation from individuality to universality. This is the process of Bildung. Without this elevation, no cultural progress can be achieved. However, for Gadamer, this process will not stop at the identity of the self and the other. Tradition, no matter how much we have understood it, will always remain to be understood again and again. In Gadamer's mind, cultural formation can never come to an end, certainly not in absolute knowledge.Footnote 23
In opposition to the completion of spirit through the dialectical development and against the dialectical relationship between the self and the other, similarly, Gadamer holds that the hermeneutical experience can never be complete. The hermeneutical understanding is not even progressive. Unlike Hegel, for Gadamer, there is no “end” at which to aim. There is even no better understanding. “It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 296). Also, for Gadamer, experience is not science, and cannot be science (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 349), quite different from Hegel's idea that the experience of consciousness is science. Gadamer agrees with Hegel that experience is what one is conscious of. Consciousness bestows meaning on the “object,” or even finds its certainty in the “object.”Footnote 24 For example, when we understand the tradition, we find ourselves and our self-knowledge in it. But, for Gadamer, the consciousness and the object can never be identical. The other cannot be eliminated or sublated by the consciousness. Likewise, experience is never complete. The hermeneutical experience is the experience of the other and a conversation with the other. Neither the self nor the other is the dominator.
For Gadamer, the intelligibility of experience cannot be formalized and conceptualized in logicFootnote 25 or by dialectic. Through the dialectic and its relationship with the subject (i.e., the subject develops dialectically), Hegel is devoted to the intelligibility of being (in the Heideggerian sense) or the intelligibility of experience (in the Gadamerian sense).Footnote 26 Hegel, like the other German idealists, bases this intelligibility on the subject or the self, with the difference that Hegel's ultimate subject is absolute spirit that undergoes dialectical and historical development.Footnote 27 But, for Gadamer, the intelligibility of experience lies in language and dialogue. In Gadamer's mind, “the occurrence of language in understanding and agreement became the underpinning of finitude” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, p. 56). Thus, language and dialogue are indications of the finitude of human beings and human experience, in contrast to the infinity of Hegel's absolute spirit and absolute knowledge.
As we can see, dialectic as a method is closely related to Hegel's theory of subjectivity. Generally, dialectic is criticized for bringing the activity of the subject to an end and making the system closed, complete, and finished once and for all. Gadamer replaces dialectic with dialogue, and replaces concept with language. For him, Hegel's dialectic together with the system of concepts is rather formal and abstract. Only through language and dialogue can the experience of the living spirit be disclosed. Further, in Gadamer's mind, what matters is not the reconciliation of the self with the other in spirit or subject through the dialectical process, but the preservation of the other. Moreover, it is dialogue and language, instead of dialectic and concept, that guarantee the finitude and openness of human experience.
Gadamer's criticism towards Hegel's dialectic is also representative. Likewise, we can take this criticism as an example of the “tension” between Hegel and other post-Hegelian philosophers. But, Gadamer's criticisms of both Hegel's subjectivity and dialectic point to the contemporary relevance of Hegel's philosophy. Moreover, in addition to the “tension,” the Hegel-Gadamer relationship has another important aspect, which is “proximity” or “closeness,” and from which more contemporary significance of Hegel's philosophy can be revealed.
3. “Closeness” Between Hegel and Gadamer
In Section 2, I discussed Gadamer's criticisms of Hegel's subjectivity and dialectic, emphasizing their different philosophical views. In this section, I dig further into the Hegel-Gadamer relationship, paying attention to their similarities. I argue that, despite their apparent differences, they share similar views on the dialectical relationship between infinity and finitude, on the importance of cultural formation or Bildung, on the intelligibility and openness of human experience, and finally on metaphysics. To some extent, this “closeness” reveals Hegel's contemporary relevance and influence.
The Hegel-Gadamer relationship is not easy to define. Gadamer himself admits his “tension-filled proximity”Footnote 28 (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, p. 53) or “strained closeness” (spannungsvolle Nähe) (Risser, Reference Risser2002, p. 86) to Hegel. Therefore, in spite of the differences or tensions, we also need to expound their “proximity” or “closeness.” Many recent studies also emphasize their “closeness.” For example, James Risser argues that “Gadamer's whole of tradition is but a variation on the Hegelian ‘truth is the whole’” and “the movement of tradition is not unlike the movement of spirit that wants to make itself at home in the world” (Risser, Reference Risser2002, p. 87). We may even say that Gadamer is not so far from Hegel, although Gadamer bestows different meanings to “subject” and “subjectivity.” Dahlstrom summarizes four aspects in which Hegel has influenced Gadamer, and which are reflected in Truth and Method.Footnote 29 Similarly, Pippin mentions that Hegel's “possible philosophical relevance for Gadamer and his contemporaries was first of all the systematic question of the human sciences, the Geisteswissenschaften.” Especially, Hegel is helpful in the latter's construction of “a ‘conversational logic’ in interrogating the past,” “a self-correcting process of historical change,” “‘effective history’ (Wirkungsgeschichte) in understanding our own situation,” and “his [Hegel's] entire systematic attempt to show that understanding other human beings and their cultural and political achievements could never happen were they to be understood as ‘objects’”Footnote 30 (Pippin, Reference Pippin2005, p. 92).
The first “closeness” between Hegel and Gadamer is their dialectical views towards the relationship between infinity and finitude. Based on what is analyzed in Section 2, Gadamer stands on the ground of finitude. In his “The Actuality of the Beautiful” (Die Aktualität des Schönen) (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer1977), Gadamer praises Heidegger for the concept of “unconcealment.” However, Gadamer claims that closely related to “unconcealment,” the concepts of “concealment” and “hiddenness” are “part of the finitude of the human beings.”Footnote 31 For Gadamer and Heidegger, finitude is characteristic of the “being” of humans. As Thomas Sheehan argues, it is not that humans are finite in comparison with God or gods (Sheehan, Reference Sheehan2015, pp. 241–242). It is from the “being” of humans ourselves that we are limited and finite. In the ultimate sense, we are mortal. Also, for Gadamer and Heidegger, only based on this finitude, human beings seek to understand the meaning of being and beings. “Our urge to survive resists death and the chaos of things going their own way apart from us.” “We struggle for a secure space where we can, at least for a while, hold things together.” “Our inescapable need of meaning is both the passing remedy for and the surest sign of our mortality. We cannot have one without the other” (Sheehan, Reference Sheehan2015, p. 114).
Although Gadamer stands on the ground of finitude, he also stresses the dialectical relationship between infinity and finitude. For example, he holds that language is speculative.Footnote 32 In each speech or discourse, what is said is always related to what is unsaid. What is said is limited, while what is unsaid is infinite. The meaning in each speech is the combination of the said together with the unsaid. “To say what one means, on the other hand — to make oneself understood — means to hold what is said together with an infinity of what is not said in one unified meaning and to ensure that it is understood in this way” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 464). Gadamer intends to integrate the finite into the infinite. In order to clarify this point, it may be necessary to quote another paragraph from Gadamer's Truth and Method:
Every word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole world-view that underlies it to appear. Thus every word, as the event of a moment, carries with it the unsaid, to which it is related by responding and summoning. The occasionality of human speech is not a casual imperfection of its expressive power; it is, rather, the logical expression of the living virtuality of speech that brings a totality of meaning into play, without being able to express it totally. All human speaking is finite in such a way that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to be explicated and laid out. That is why the hermeneutical phenomenon also can be illuminated only in light of the fundamental finitude of being, which is wholly verbal in character. (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall1975, p. 454)
Language is limited, but it is also unlimited. There is always something more, something “unsaid” beyond the “said.” In Gadamer's mind, there is a kind of “transcendence” from the finite to the infinite in language.Footnote 33 According to Jean Grondin, “To possess a language is in a way to be able to rise above it, to enlarge our horizons whilst remaining in the horizon of possible sayings.” “Human language is thus characterized by a perpetual self-transcendence: it always goes beyond itself by the very fact that it is language,” and “it is always possible to understand oneself in another way, and to raise oneself above established understanding” (Grondin, Reference Grondin and Plant2003, p. 148).
In terms of infinity and finitude, Hegel also holds a dialectical view. It is generally believed that Hegel favours the infinite and opposes the finite. However, this is only one aspect of the whole story. In explaining Dasein, Hegel claims that “Insofar as human beings want to be actual, they must exist [muß dasein] and to this end they must limit themselves. Those who are too dismayed at the finite do not accomplish anything actual, but instead remain trapped in the abstract and fade away into themselves” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 148). However, the finite has limitation in itself. It must go beyond itself, because it is “something” that is also “the other.” This kind of self-contradiction drives itself beyond itself and arouses change. “Living things die, and they do so simply because they carry the germ of death in themselves” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 148).
Related to the dialectical relationship between the infinite and the finite is Hegel's idea of the “good infinite.” For Hegel, the “bad infinite” is “Something becomes an other, but the other is itself a something, hence it likewise becomes an other, and so on and so forth ad infinitum” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 149). That is to say, something and the other are external to each other. The “good infinite” or “true infinite” consists in “being with itself in its other, or, put in terms of a process, to come to itself in its other” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 149). The infinite and the finite are in a dialectical relationship. They should not be taken separately. In other words, Hegel's good infinite integrates the finite into itself. It means that the finite plays its role in the infinite. Finite experience, the multiple phenomena, something sensible and perceptible are all important. But what Hegel wants to say is that we cannot stop at these finite things. We need a higher horizon and a total perspective, which is infinity. Under and guided by the infinite, we deal with the finite and sublate the finite.
Hegel's infinite or the good infinite is not a fixed or unmovable substance, but instead is the subject that moves and develops. It is generally supposed that Hegel advocates for the “good infinite,” while Gadamer supports the “bad infinite.” However, when we take Hegel's spirit or subject as a constant movement or development, Hegel's “good infinite” may not differ so much from Gadamer's “bad infinite.” Gadamer declares: “I became an advocate of the ‘bad infinite’ for which the end keeps on delaying its arrival — something that for Hegel is not merely an untruth but a truth as well” (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, p. 40). Moreover, as is discussed above, Gadamer himself acknowledges the transcendence from the finite to the infinite. Thus, despite the apparently different positions concerning infinity and finitude, in fact, both Gadamer and Hegel combine the infinite and the finite, which shows their “closeness.”
The second “closeness” lies in the importance of cultural formation (Bildung) to both Hegel and Gadamer. Actually, Gadamer draws a lot from Hegel's thought on cultural formation. According to Dahlstrom, there are at least three aspects for which Gadamer should be grateful to Hegel. First, Gadamer acknowledges Bildung is acquiring the ability to elevate one's individual perspective to a universal level. Second, Gadamer learns from Hegel that Bildung is the process of gaining self-consciousness through work or labour. Third, Gadamer recognizes “the fundamental movement of the human spirit,” which means “to reconcile oneself with oneself, to recognize oneself in another's being”Footnote 34 (Dahlstrom, Reference Dahlstrom, George and van der Heiden2022, pp. 233–234). Cultural formation or Bildung is one main aspect of spirit. It is the process in which spirit gets to know itself and to actualize itself. Its importance for both Hegel and Gadamer reveals their shared concerns and interests in understanding the development of spirit.
The third “closeness” that is worthy of mention is that both Hegel and Gadamer pursue the “intelligibility”Footnote 35 of the human experience. The whole system of Hegel's philosophy is to explain the meaning of being. For him, the best way to achieve the intelligibility is through concepts. Gadamer, following Heidegger, also focuses on the “meaning of being.” Gadamer relies more on language to clarify the world experience. He speaks of “an anteriority of language to thought. To think is to try to explain yourself in words.” However, as Grondin reveals, “Gadamer eventually speaks of a contemporaneity of language to thought, rather than of an anteriority” (Grondin, Reference Grondin and Plant2003, p. 143). Of course, we cannot deny the importance of language or even the “anteriority of language to thought” in Gadamer's philosophy.Footnote 36 But we can at least detect a kind of hesitation or uncertainty about the language-thought relationship. After all, for Gadamer, as well as for Hegel, language and thought or concept are to understand our being in the world. That is to say, both Hegel and Gadamer hold that world experience is intelligible, either through concept or through language, or through both.
Apart from intelligibility, both Hegel and Gadamer also stress the openness of human experience. Although Gadamer deems Hegel's absolute to be a closed and complete whole, in fact, Hegel's absolute spirit and infinite subject may not be so closed or complete. For Hegel, the absolute is both completed and to be completed. Therefore, instead of being closed, Hegel's absolute is open. “Having been completed” is only one aspect of Hegel's absolute. The other aspect is “to be completed,” which shows the openness of Hegel's thought. With finitude, what Gadamer and Heidegger pursue is the openness of experience. For example, in art, it means to dig out “more” meanings from the artwork.Footnote 37 In Heidegger's words, Dasein is between “having been completed” and “to be completed.”Footnote 38 So, concerning the human experience, both Hegel and Gadamer hold an open attitude.Footnote 39
The last “closeness” between Hegel and Gadamer can be seen through Gadamer's acknowledgement of Hegel's metaphysics. In contemporary philosophy, Hegel's metaphysics, ontology, and logic face many obstacles. However, Gadamer is not as critical as many other philosophers concerning Hegel's metaphysics.Footnote 40 For example, Gadamer shows more sympathy than Heidegger. Gadamer concludes “The Heritage of Hegel” article with the following words:
That does not mean that metaphysics as a science, this unique form (Gestalt) of our Western civilization that found in Hegel its triumphal completion and its end, would be possible for us. But without this heritage of metaphysics, it would not be possible for us even to comprehend what that science is that determines our age most profoundly, and what place it assumes and what function it serves within our own self-understanding. In full awareness of our finitude we remain exposed to questions that go beyond us. They befall us — if not already the individual in his most quiet moments, then all of us from the vantage of that in the light of which we all know ourselves; and in this way we all confirm Hegel's doctrine of the absolute spirit. With him we know about the manifoldness of the encounter with ourselves that reaches beyond every historical conditionedness. We encounter ourselves in art, in spite of all social utilitarianism. We encounter ourselves in the challenge of religion that perdures in the age of science. No less do we encounter ourselves in thinking. There it is the questions that we call philosophical and that promote us ever further in our intercourse with our philosophic tradition. From them in truth no thinking being can ever completely hold himself at a remove. I do not need to demonstrate this further in Swabian country. These questions hold us in suspense. (Gadamer, Reference Gadamer and Lawrence1981, pp. 52–53)
This paragraph is a good summarization of the “closeness” between Hegel and Gadamer as Gadamer recognizes Hegel's heritage for us to understand ourselves and for our cultural formation or Bildung. It also reveals Gadamer's dialectical view on the relationship between the finite and the infinite as we also pursue “questions that go beyond us.” Gadamer also emphasizes the importance of Hegel's doctrine of absolute spirit for us to seek meaning in the modern world. In short, Gadamer means that, despite many differences and changed circumstances between Hegel and our contemporary world, despite many possible insufficiencies of Hegel's metaphysics in solving the present problems, and despite the difficulties in understanding Hegel, we still need to inherit his metaphysics in order to understand the science “that determines our age most profoundly.” As Gadamer acknowledges, Hegel's absolute spirit (which comprises of art, religion, and philosophy) still holds us. Gadamer's self-acknowledgement also demonstrates his “closeness” to Hegel.
Of course, there are more aspects about the “closeness” or “proximity” between Hegel and Gadamer. Both have covered many important topics concerning human understanding, knowing, and being. What I have discussed in this section, namely the dialectical relationship between the infinite and the finite, the importance of cultural formation or Bildung, the intelligibility and openness of human experience, and Gadamer's acknowledgement of Hegel's metaphysics are four main aspects of their “closeness.” Based on this “closeness,” we can see Hegel's relevance and influence on contemporary philosophers. However, in order to further defend the contemporary significance of Hegel's theory of subjectivity and his thought on dialectic and concept, I will give more elucidation in the next section.
4. Hegel's Theory of Subjectivity
In Section 2, Gadamer's criticisms of Hegel's subjectivityFootnote 41 and dialectic are analyzed, with the emphasis on their different philosophical positions. In Section 3, their similar views on several important issues are discussed, revealing their “closeness.” This section is focused on elucidating Hegel's theory of subjectivity through an analysis of the characteristics of Hegel's spirit as subject and the characteristics of concept. The purpose of this elucidation is to further clarify the contemporary significance of Hegel's philosophy.
It is generally believed that the dilemmas of modernity — such as nothingness of existence, emptiness of the spirit, and loss of meaning — are caused by the modern subjectivity, especially theoretical rationality. So, the criticism of modernity, represented by post-modernism and post-structuralism, is mainly the criticism of modern rationality. Philosophers who criticize modern rationality believe that reason has become an “instrumental reason” and has become the power to suppress people rather than serve people. For many critics, modern subjectivity can lead to the separation between man and nature, between man and man, and between theory and the real world. Nowadays, nature is more and more under the control of human beings, and human affairs are dealt more and more technically. Heidegger attributes these to the “Gestalt” (enframing) way of thinking, which corresponds more or less to Hegel's criticism of understanding. Phenomena, such as utilitarianism, manipulation, calculation, commercialization, etc. are reflections of certain aspects of this “Gestalt” way of thinking. For the above reasons, we are now faced with a crisis of subjectivity.
In contemporary debates, many people have attempted to define “subjectivity” in the modern sense. Dieter Henrich believes that “subjectivity” is characteristic of the subject and is the inner organization of the subject's consciousness. This organization makes the subject's self-understanding and the understanding of the surrounding world possible (Freundlieb, Reference Freundlieb2003, p. 33). Kim Atkins (Reference Atkins2005) holds that “subjectivity” is a kind of self-reflective activity, which is the reflection and evaluation of thoughts, emotions, and actions. Jason M. Miller (Reference Miller2011) sees “subjectivity” as an individual or collective identity. In Manfred Frank's view, “subjectivity” is the consciousness of one's own being (Frank, Reference Frank, Klemm and Zöller1997). Foucault points out that “subjectivity” is constituted by the discourse of truth, which forms the subject's experience of self and others (Foucault, Reference Foucault2017, p. 13). These attempts show certain aspects of “subjectivity.” However, to some extent, it is Hegel who reveals some of the most essential characteristics of subjectivity.
4.1 Characteristics of Spirit as Subject
“Subjectivity” is closely related to “subject.” In Hegel's philosophy, “subject” takes many forms, including soul, consciousness, self-consciousness, spirit, concept, rationality, history, etc. In this section, I want to explain some of the characteristics of subjectivity reflected in Phenomenology of Spirit by taking spirit as the main subject. The purpose of this explanation is twofold: one, to correct certain misunderstandings about Hegel's main concepts, and two, to manifest the importance of Hegel's absolute spirit for the present.
The first important characteristic of spirit as subject is that spirit is a subject-substance in unity or as a whole, which also constitutes its absoluteness. One important principle of Hegel's philosophy is “substance is subject.”Footnote 42 However, it is not a fixed formula. Actually, what we see in Phenomenology of Spirit is the process of substance becoming subject and subject becoming substance. It is the aim of the spirit's development that, at the end of this process, the spirit knows itself both as subject and substance. Hegel deems that it is in the form of conceptFootnote 43 (or notion) that spirit achieves this absolute knowledge.
Thus, what in religion was content or a form for presenting an other, is here the Self's own act; the Notion requires the content to be the Self's own act. For this Notion is, as we see, the knowledge of the Self's act within itself as all essentiality and all existence, the knowledge of this subject as substance and of the substance as this knowledge of its act. (Hegel, Reference Hegel and Miller1977, p. 485)
Here, Hegel distinguishes philosophy as a science from religion. In religion, the content and form of spirit are still external to each other. Thus, the knowledge gained in religion is not the complete self-knowledge of spirit. But, in philosophy, in the form of concept,Footnote 44 spirit achieves true knowledge through “the Self's own act.” This knowledge is also the spirit's essentiality and existence, and is the substance. According to Hegel, absolute knowledge is the knowledge that refers to “this subject as substance” and “the substance as this knowledge of its act.”
The second important characteristic of spirit as subject is that it aims at truth. In Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, truth is closely related to the subject. They promote each other in mutual relations and in their progress and activity. In Phenomenology of Spirit, the “being” of humans is manifested in their “spirituality,” represented by the various “ideologies.” If these different forms of “consciousness” are understood at an individual level or seen from the perspective of a person,Footnote 45 the activity of spirit can be regarded as a process in which one pursues self-knowledge, and which becomes an event of truth (in a Heideggerian sense). But, this process requires a person to make “spiritual” changes in order to gradually approach the truth, and even become truth itself, thus turning the self-certainty of one's knowledge into truth. At the same time, truth or subject should not be taken as a given or a static thing, but it is a process that is constantly being pursued. The process depends on the changes that the subject has made in himself. Reaching truth at a certain stage is also a completion of the self at a certain stage. This completion is also preservation and transformation, which is the process of “sublation” (Aufhebung).
The third important characteristic is that spirit as subject is always active and undergoing changes, instead of being fixed and static. Hegel believes that “The absolute mind, while it is self-centred identity, is always also identity returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substance it is so as a spirit, discerning itself into a self and a consciousness, for which it is as substance” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Wallace and Miller1971, p. 292). As we can see, for Hegel, absolute spirit is “returning and ever returned into itself” and it discerns “itself into a self and a consciousness.” As a self, it remains self-identical. As a consciousness, it is self-difference that takes itself to be the object and the substance. Further, absolute spirit as subject is a constant process without any definite ending point, because it is “returning and ever returned into itself,” the present progressive tense being a guarantee of the constant process. This is also the difference between Hegel's absolute spirit and Baruch Spinoza's substance. Once absolute spirit stops at a certain point, it would become just like Spinoza's unmovable substance. Although Hegel deems that “thinking, or the spirit, has to place itself at the standpoint of Spinozism” in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brown and Stewart1990, p. 154), he also tries to sublate Spinoza's substance. That is also why his logic moves from the doctrine of essence, the last phase of which is Spinoza's substance, to the doctrine of concept.Footnote 46
The fourth characteristic is that spirit as subject is transcendental because it is the condition for the world to be meaningful.Footnote 47 Closely related to the “transcendentality” of spirit is its characteristic of “ideality.”Footnote 48 Hegel argues in Philosophy of Mind that “We must designate as the distinctive determinateness of the Notion of mind, ideality, that is, the reduction of the Idea's otherness to a moment, the process of returning — and the accomplished return — into itself of the Idea from its Other” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Wallace and Miller1971, p. 9). In the relationship of subject-object or self-world, spirit as subject will not let the object go untouched or remain as it was, but instead turns the latter into “a moment” or the Other into itself, thus idealizing it. In this process, the object or the world also gains its meaning. The ability of spirit to idealize makes it the condition for the world to be meaningful. In this sense, spirit as subject can be taken as transcendental. However, this does not mean that spirit is subjectivist. On the contrary, spirit as subject-object is the mutual formation of the subject and the object, the self and the world. Hegel does acknowledge the importance of the object and the world in the process of any meaning-formation. The transcendentality of the spirit refers to the leading role spirit as subject plays in this process. Spirit contains infinite possibilities, which is also the basis for the various understandings of the world. To some extent, spirit as subject gives meaning to the world. The meaning-giving relationship between the subject and the world is of great significance in Hegel's theory of subjectivity.
The last important characteristic that I want to emphasize is that spirit as the subject is post-transcendental, for it is historically conditioned and undergoes historical movement.Footnote 49 Spirit as subject is different from both the ancient's understanding and the modern consciousness. Different from the ancients, who place the rational order before and above self-consciousness, and regard the rational order as something higher than self-consciousness, Hegel believes that self-consciousness has its rational order in the “absolute,” which is the complete self-knowledge. Hegel's “absolute” is the completion of the modern subject (German, Reference German2011, p. 233). However, Hegel's subject is also different from the modern consciousness or the modern “self,” because Hegel holds that the subject has a historical dimension. In other words, the uniqueness of Hegel's dealing with the modern problem of “subjectivity” lies in that he makes subjectivity a historical movement between subject and object. He admits that subjectivity is influenced and bounded by historical “context,”Footnote 50 thus making the subjectivity objective, and further absolute and infinite.
In a nutshell, the above characteristics of spirit as subject are related to its absoluteness, wholeness, unity, activity, truth, constant change, and process. Spirit as the condition for the world to be meaningful and its historical situatedness are also particularly stressed, which makes it transcendental and post-transcendental at the same time. Hegel's spirit as subject is often criticized (even misunderstood) by contemporary philosophers. The discussion in this section intends to make a certain defence for Hegel.
4.2 Dialectic and Characteristics of Concept
Hegel's dialectic and thought on concept are often challenged by contemporary philosophers. Gadamer's criticism is representative, as is discussed in Section 2.2. This section reveals the importance of dialectic as an immanent method to the content and subject itself. Dialectic plays an important role not only in the development of spirit as subject, but also in the development of concept as subject. Four special characteristics of Hegel's concept will be expounded in this section, namely it is objective, rational, dialectical, and historical, thus further defending the contemporary significance of Hegel's theory of subjectivity and his thought on dialectic and concept.
Hegel's theory of subjectivity is inseparable from the dialectical method. Heidegger also acknowledges the close relationship between method and subjectivity in Hegel's philosophy:
“Method” is the innermost movement of subjectivity, “the soul of being,” the production process through which the web of the whole actuality of the absolute is woven. “Method,” “the soul of being” — that sounds like fantasy. It is commonly thought that our age has left behind such errors of speculation. Yet we are living right in the midst of this supposed fantasy. (Heidegger, Reference Heidegger and McNeill1998, p. 326)
As is revealed by Heidegger, Hegel's “method” is “the innermost movement of subjectivity,” “the soul of being.” Thus, unlike the method used in mathematics and modern sciences, Hegel's dialectical method is not external to the subject. In the “Preface” to Phenomenology of Spirit, when Hegel criticizes mathematics, he reveals the external relationship between the subject matter and the construction of proof in demonstrating a theorem or proposition (Hegel, Reference Hegel and Miller1977, pp. 25–28). In Science of Logic, Hegel also criticizes the external relationship between method and content in modern epistemology. In the “Preface to the First Edition,” when Hegel considers making “a completely fresh start with this science [logic],” he means that “an altogether new concept of scientific procedure is at work here,” which is the dialectical procedure. He emphasizes that the method of philosophy “can only be the nature of the content which is responsible for movement in scientific knowledge, for it is the content's own reflection that first posits and generates what that content is” (Hegel, Reference Hegel and di Giovanni2010b, pp. 9–10). The method is the “content's own reflection” and the content's own development. Thus, the method is immanent to the content. This method is applicable not only to spirit as subject, but also to concept as subject.
Following the dialectical method, the first special characteristic of Hegel's concept is that concept is objective rather than subjective. In logic, Hegel criticizes understanding and the representational thinking because they are embodiment of the subjectivist consciousness. In Hegel's view, the traditional metaphysics, Kant's philosophy, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte's philosophy are all representatives of understanding. The traditional metaphysics is finite. It imposes limited thinking presuppositions, such as being and infinity on God, the world, and the soul. However, in this way, the thing and its concept are only externally related (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 69). Due to subjectivism, there are different opinions on God, the world, and the soul.
Hegel is unsatisfied with Kant's understanding of concept. In Kant's critical philosophy, whether concepts are subjective or objective is debatable.Footnote 51 In Hegel's opinion, Kant's “objective” is also in a subjective sense, because the categories only belong to the thinking subject. For Hegel, the concepts in logic both define our way of thinking and are constitutive of the structure of the world. So, they are both subjective and objective. “[T]he true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts but at the same time the in-itself of things and of the object-world [des Gegenständlichen] in General” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 85). Hegel believes that “the objectivity of thinking” both belongs to us and the things themselves. The concept is the essence of the thing itself, which Brandom calls “conceptual realism” (Brandom, Reference Brandom2019, p. 3).
The second special characteristic of Hegel's concept is that concept is rational. Rational concept provides a solution to the problems caused by understanding and the representational way of thinking, especially the problem of modern subjectivism. Hegel's philosophy is based on rationality. For Hegel, rationality is a combination of concept and reality, subjectivity and objectivity. What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational. Rational actuality is actual rationality, and furthermore, it is the Idea. The reason that things are truthful is that their reality is consistent with the Idea. Hegel claims, “But everything actual, insofar as it is something true, is also the idea and possesses its truth only through and in virtue of the idea” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 283).
The third special characteristic of concept is that it follows the dialectical process. As is analyzed above, the dialectical method is immanent to the subject and content. The development of concept is self-determined. Truth as the idea is the realization of the consistency between concept and reality, which undergoes a series of intermediary processes. Hegel stresses that the intermediary process takes place within the concept and without resorting to external things. “[T]his central point exhibits the mediation in it [i.e. in that standpoint] itself and, indeed, in that mediation's true determination, not as a mediation with and through something external, but as establishing itself in itself [sich in sich selbst beschließend]” (Hegel, Reference Hegel, Brinkmann and Dahlstrom2010a, p. 118). The self-determination and self-development of concept is illustrative of the dialectical method.
The final special characteristic of concept that is worth mentioning is that concept also goes on an intermediary process in history,Footnote 52 thus obtaining its substantive content. Theories on subject and subjectivity since modernity are generally lacking in substantive content. The problem of the subjectivist tendencies in understanding and the representational thinking also lies in the lack of substantive content. On the contrary, Hegel's logic is the development of the concept with its own reality. Hegel praises Kant insofar as he already regards the concept as the original unity of the apperception. “It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of Reason that the unity which constitutes the essence of the concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of the ‘I think,’ or of self-consciousness” (Hegel, Reference Hegel and di Giovanni2010b, p. 515). However, Kant misses the point later by separating the world of experience and thing-in-itself, as well as by limiting knowledge in the sphere of the former. “Then, again, the Kantian philosophy has never got over the psychological reflex of the concept and has once more reverted to the claim that the concept is permanently conditioned by the manifold of intuition” (Hegel, Reference Hegel and di Giovanni2010b, p. 520). Thus, Kant's categories are actually not self-determined and lacking in the true reality. Whether the concept has its own content or not is a difference between Hegel and Kant as well as between Hegel's understanding of concept and those of others. Taking concept to be self-determining and self-developing in history is the unique feature of Hegel's logic.
In the modern and contemporary philosophical context, Hegel's dialectic and his thought on concept are often devalued. The immanence of the dialectical method to content is often neglected. Moreover, subjectivism represented by understanding and the representational thinking also overshadows the conceptual way of thinking. In the context of modern philosophy, being objective, rational, dialectical, and historical is what makes Hegel's understanding of concept special. The elucidation in this section will hopefully arouse more interest in Hegel's dialectic and his thought on concept, and cause philosophers to reconsider their contemporary significance.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this conclusion, I want to briefly add two thoughts about Hegel's absolute spirit and his concept, as further proof of their contemporary significance.
First, as an important subject, Hegel's spirit is subject-substance, which overcomes the subjective tendency of the modern “self,” and includes the substantial content (the social and historical aspects) within itself. However, what is understated is that Hegel does not stop at the objective spiritFootnote 53 (which generally includes right, morality, ethics, and history). For Hegel, both the subjective spirit and the objective spirit are limited. They belong to the field of finitude. The absolute spirit is a higher phase than the objective spirit and it is the truth of both the objective spirit and the subjective spirit. In a secularized world, it is true that the objective spirit is more relevant to us today. However, we should acknowledge that, for Hegel, it is absolute spirit that is the true and ultimate subject. Absolute spirit (the areas of art, religion, and philosophyFootnote 54) concerns the wholeness of our being. Even if we want to “apply” his objective spirit, we'd better place it within the system and understand its relationship with his absolute spirit.
Second, Hegel's concept is also a subject which develops into a whole system, and which enables us to know what we are, how we think, and how we understand our world. It is also the mutual formation of the subject and the world. Concepts help us to understand what kind of logical order and logical relationship makes us what we are today. Also, concepts contribute to our understanding of the world around us. Concepts not only express our own subjectivity, but also reveal the nature of things.Footnote 55 Logic, as well as Phenomenology of Spirit, is a “story.” But what we are now is not made up of “facts” that occur in the world, but rather of our understanding of ourselves and the world we are in. Hegel's philosophy provides us with a “whole” vision and a conceptual framework. It works as a guide for our understanding and being. This “whole” vision of concepts is also characteristic of Hegel's theory of subjectivity.
In short, despite the many criticisms and challenges that Hegel's philosophy faces, I argue that his theory of subjectivity, together with his thought on dialectic and concept, is still of importance. After all, how we deal with Hegel's philosophy concerns more about our being and our understanding at present rather than Hegel's being and understanding. Our understanding of ourselves and the world is closely related to subjectivity. Only equipped with a good understanding of subjectivity can we satisfactorily deal with contemporary problems such as alienation, instrumentalization, utilitarianism, commercialization, mechanization, etc. Hegel's theory of subjectivity and his thought on dialect and concept can give us inspiration and be of much help in these respects.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by Liaoning Province Social Science Planning Fund under Grant (L21CWW001). I'm grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their precious comments on the manuscript of this article. I would also like to thank Jill Flohil for her careful editing on language and style.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
