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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 February 2012
ABSTRACT: Substance is the central idea in Spinoza’s philosophy, but it is not always clear which view of substance he adopts. Is substance the totality of nature or everything that exists or is it not? In taking a fresh look at his view of substance, I will first demonstrate that he takes both views. Secondly, I will show that each view does not contradict the other. Thirdly, I will see what consequences each view has for other ideas in his philosophy. Finally, I will explain the relationship between the two views.
RÉSUMÉ: L’idée de substance est au centre la philosophie de Spinoza, mais il n’est pas toujours évident de savoir quelle conception il adopte. Est-elle ou non la totalité de la nature, ou tout ce qui existe? En adoptant un point de vue nouveau sur la conception de la substance chez Spinoza, je vais démontrer, tout d’abord, qu’il adopte ces deux points de vue à la fois. Deuxièmement, je montrerai que ces deux positions n’entrent pas en contradiction Troisièmement, je montrerai quelles sont les conséquences de ces deux points de vue sur d’autres idées dans sa philosophie. Finalement, j’expliquerai la relation entre ces deux points de vue.
1 Edwin Curley has the view that substance denotes only the active part of nature and states that there is very little evidence for the alternative view – that substance denotes the totality of things. See his Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 42-43, and Behind the Geometrical Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 30-39. In the latter book he states, though, that the alternative view is not hopelessly unintelligible. Martial Gueroult identifies substance or the attributes of substance with the first elements of the whole of nature, not the whole of nature itself but only its active part (natura naturans). See his Spinoza (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), vol. 1, p. 169 fn. Henry Allison, in Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction (rev. ed., Yale: Yale University Press, 1987), chap. 3, points out that natura naturata or the modes are not properties, predicates, or states of substance. S. Paul Kashap argues that substance or God is not identical with nature as a whole. To say that it is identical is to ignore Spinoza’s distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata. See his Spinoza and Moral Freedom (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 25-28. David Savan, in “Spinoza on Duration, Time, and Eternity” in Spinoza: The Enduring Questions, ed. Graeme Hunter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 4, also identifies God with natura naturans, not natura naturata. Richard Mason, in The God of Spinoza (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 30-31, agrees with Curley. The alternative or traditional view is expressed by Frederick Pollock, who states in Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul, 1880), p. 162, that we cannot seriously apply a conception of substance to anything short of the whole sum of being. Harold Joachim, in A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Brasted UK: Russell & Russell, 1964, reissue of 1901), p. 75, holds that particular things are states or modes of God. Harry Wolfson, in The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cleveland OH: World Publishing, 1934), vol. 1, p. 97, identifies God with the wholeness of nature. Stuart Hampshire, in Spinoza (Baltimore MD: Penguin, 1951), p. 36, calls substance an all-inclusive totality that is identified with the universe as a whole. Errol Harris, in Salvation from Despair (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 36, tells us that substance means the whole of reality that is absolutely complete and all comprehensive. Jonathan Bennett, in his A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1984), pp. 92-95, holds that the relation between particular things and substance is like the relation of property to its possessor. More recently Steven Nadler, in “Whatever Is, Is in God: Substance and Things in Spinoza’s Metaphysics” in Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 53-70, argues that God is identical with the whole universe in both its active and its passive aspects.
2 In this paper I am using Curley’s translation in The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). For the correspondence, I am using Samuel Shirley’s translation The Letters (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1995) and for the Theological-Political Treatise, I again am using Samuel Shirley’s translation (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1998). I will use the following abbreviations: E for Ethics, Def for “definition,” A for “axiom,” P for “proposition,” D for “demonstration,” S for “scholium,” C for “corollary,” Exp for “explanation,” and App for “appendix”; TdIE for Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect followed by section number; KV for Short Treatise followed by part, chapter, and section number; CM for Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts followed by part and chapter; and TTP for the Theological-Political Treatise followed by chapter and page.
3 Spinoza says exactly this in the TTP, chapter 7, p. 93, where he tells us that when we examine natural phenomena we must first discover those features that are most universal and common to the whole of nature, such as motion and rest, and then advance gradually from these to other less universal features.
4 In the KV1/9 Spinoza says that the modes – motion in matter and intellect in thought – are infinite in their kind, but he never says this in the Ethics. Their kind, though, must be distinguished from the infinity of the attributes that are infinite after their kind.
5 Richard Mason says that “if you take seriously the claim that God is infinite, how can you then say that anything in nature can be excluded from God?” See his The God of Spinoza (n. 1, above), p. 38.
6 There is a debate in the literature as to whether the attributes should be taken as subjective or objective. The subjective view can be supported by E1Def4, which says that an attribute is what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence. This would be the case if we interpret the intellect as finite. Then it would seem that the attributes depend on the way that the human mind conceives substance. But if we interpret the intellect as infinite, then it would be the case that the attributes are closer to the way that substance sees itself. In that case the attributes would really be in substance independent of the human mind. This, though, depends on whether we consider the infinite intellect as an infinite mode of God (which is usually the case) or as constituting the essence of God’s mind.
7 In the KV1/9, Spinoza says that motion and intellect are eternal and infinite in their kinds but can only be and be understood through extension and intellect. In Letter 2, he says that motion cannot be conceived through itself and in itself for it requires extension.
8 In Letter 64 Spinoza says that absolutely infinite intellect is the immediate mode under the attribute of thought.
9 There are various views about the status of these modes. For example, Edwin Curley takes these modes to be laws that serve as principles of explanation for less general laws and for particular happenings in nature. See his Behind the Geometrical Method (n. 1, above), pp. 45-46. Yirmiyahu Yovel takes the infinite modes to be singular entities that perform a universal function which Spinoza describes in TdIE [101]. See Yovel’s “The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza,” in God and Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics, ed. Yovel (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 82-85.
10 Here Spinoza is using the word “universe” in a more limited way to refer to the infinite mediate mode under extension. Yovel thinks that “face” signifies the system of all laws governing the universe under the infinite immediate mode of extension rather than the series of all particular finite modes. See his “The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza” (n. 9, above), p. 88.
11 A question can be raised here as to whether Spinoza’s use of the words “whole of nature” here means an individual separate and distinct from the totality of finite modes or whether it means the same as the totality of finite modes. I think that we have to hold that it is separate from the finite modes, because it is an infinite mode whereas the finite modes obviously are not. The whole of nature is not simply a collection of finite modes. If it were, Spinoza would not say that “the face of the whole universe” is a mediate infinite mode.
12 By saying that some infinities are greater than others he does not mean that infinity can be divided, because infinity has no parts. See E1P12-13.
13 Spinoza provides further evidence that substance includes everything in E1P18 and Letter 73, where he tells us that God is the immanent cause of all things. If God is the immanent cause of everything, then there is nothing outside of God.
14 At the very beginning of the Ethics, in Def. 1, Spinoza says that the cause of itself is that whose essence involves existence. According to E1P20, this means God.
15 In the preface to E2, Spinoza says that he is going to address those things that follow from the essence of God. One can take “follow” to mean those things that are not included in the essence of God.
16 Not everyone believes that efficient causes are transitive. See, for example, Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 30-33.
17 Spinoza presents another argument for the difference between substance and modes in Ep35 and CM2/5. There he says that substance is simple but the modes are a complex system, so it seems that a complex system cannot fit into a simple substance.
18 Spinoza uses the words “from eternity” in a number of places such as to suggest a beginning. But in CM2/10 Spinoza says that “from eternity” means duration without any beginning, or a duration so great that it cannot be expressed by any number. He denies that such duration applies to God. He also uses the words “from eternity” in E1P17S1 and E1P33S2 as if to suggest that there was a certain starting point in nature, but later in the same scholium he says that there is no when or before or after.
19 See, for example, Alan Donagan, “Spinoza’s Proof of Immortality,” and Martha Kneale, “Eternity and Sempiternity,” in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (New York: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 244-245 and 236-237 respectively.
20 Spinoza also uses the word “always” when talking about the attributes in E1P10S. There he says that all the attributes have always been in substance together. But later in the same scholium he says that each of the attributes expresses an eternal and infinite essence.
21 Yovel takes the view that the infinite modes have only indefinite duration. See his “The Infinite Mode and Natural Laws in Spinoza” (n. 9, above) p. 85. Jonathan Bennett goes further and holds that God has duration. See his A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (see note 1 above), pp. 204-207. I think that given the evidence I have cited, both of them are wrong.
22 In Letter 10, Spinoza says that the existence of attributes does not differ from their essence. An attribute, like substance, is conceived in itself and through itself. Its conception does not involve the conception of another thing (Letter 2).
23 I think it is a bold move to say that the essence of the infinite modes involves existence since the infinite modes belong to naturata naturata. But on the other hand infinite modes, such as motion and rest, are part of the laws of nature and have to exist so that finite modes can follow these laws.
24 Whether the essences of things other than God are eternal or not has been debated by Curley. See his Collected Works (n. 2, above), p. 409, fn. 5. But the idea that the essence of things other than God occurs in E1P17S, where Spinoza says that the essence of a man is an eternal truth, and in E1P24C, where Spinoza says that the essence of things involves neither existence nor duration. So here Spinoza cannot be talking merely about God, whose essence involves existence. The idea also occurs in TdIE [67 and 100], where he says that the existence of a thing is not an eternal truth but its essence is; in TdIE [101], where he tells us that the essence of singular, changeable things is to be found in fixed and eternal things; and in the KV1/1[2], where we are told that the essences of things are from all eternity and will remain immutable to all eternity. Here he mentions the plural “things,” so he could be talking about things other than God. Finally, in CM 1/2 he says that the essences of things are eternal.
25 See, for example, David Savan, “Spinoza on Duration, Time, and Eternity” (n. 1, above), pp. 3-30 and Christopher Martin, “The Framework of Essences in Spinoza’s Ethics,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (3), August 2008, pp. 489-509. Savan, like Curley in Behind the Geometrical Method (n. 1, above), pp. 37 and 43, identifies God with natura naturans. Both hold, mistakenly I think, that the infinite universe is natura naturata. If that is the case, then substance or God is beyond the infinite universe. Where or how could that be? Spinoza says that the whole of nature is divided into natura naturans and natura naturata (KV1/8). Yitzhak Melamed points out that God, insofar as he is a free cause, is natura naturans, but insofar as God is modified by a modification that is finite and has a determinate existence, God is natura naturata. If God were not identical with natura naturata he would be limited. See Melamed’s “Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1), January 2009, pp. 17-82.
26 For this see E5P45S, where he talks about the existence of particular things without duration.
27 Genevieve Lloyd’s view, in her “Spinoza’s Version of the Eternity of the Mind” (in Spinoza and the Sciences, ed. Marjorie Grene and Debra Nails [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986], pp. 216-219), comes close to my view, but she does not make the distinction between actual and formal reality as I think Spinoza does.
28 See, for example, E2P9, E2P11C, E2P20D, E2P40D.
29 Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. Richard Popkin (Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1965), p. 311.
30 In the TdIE[100] Spinoza says that it is impossible to grasp the series of mutable things because they are too many, and because of the number of factors affecting a thing.
31 In the TTP, chapter 3, pp. 37-38, Spinoza distinguishes between God’s internal help and God’s external help. What human beings can achieve solely through their own power is called God’s internal help, and what happens to human beings from the power of external causes is God’s external help. By external help he means fortune, or those causes that are unforeseen.
32 Spinoza says that the objects of God’s knowledge are not outside of him. God, unlike a builder, does not seek material outside himself (CM2/7).
33 The “whole of nature” can mean various things in Spinoza. By the “whole of nature” in E2P13L7S he means the infinite totality of finite modes which is the infinite mediate mode under extension; in E1P11S and KV2/22[4] he means substance; in TdIE[12-13] he means laws of nature; in TIdE[75] he talks about the first elements of the whole of nature (if this is the case then the whole of nature must have other elements that would include natura naturata); in KV1/8 he means both substance and modes; and in CM2/7 he means one being where the idea of God concerning natura naturata is one.
34 Stuart Hampshire says that nature is not a temporal sequence of events, but a logical sequence. There is a logical sense of “follows.” See his Spinoza (n.1, above), p. 174. Also, Jonathan Bennett thinks that when Spinoza says that infinite and eternal modes follow from the attributes, we do not take him to mean that extension caused it to involve motion and rest. There is a logical dependence here, not a causal dependence. See Bennet’s “Spinoza’s Monism; A Reply to Curley” in God and Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics (Leiden: E .J. Brill, 1991), p. 58.
35 Spinoza says that God is the cause of the being of things as well as the cause of the coming to be of things (E2P10CS). Steven Nadler refers to a medieval distinction between causality with respect to being (causalitas secundum esse) and causality with respect to becoming (causalitas secundum fieri). See his “‘Whatever is, is in God’: Substance and Things in Spinoza’s Metaphysics” (n. 1, above), p. 62. I take the first causality to be that of the essence of things and the second causality to be that of the existence of things.
36 Michael Della Rocca makes the point that if a thing is caused by another then it is conceived through another. The word “in” is coextensive with causation and being conceived through. Effects are properties of the cause. The effect is in the cause. See his “Rationalism Run Amok: Representation and the Reality of Emotions in Spinoza,” in Interpreting Spinoza (see n. 1), pp. 42-44. I think that his point, though, does not apply to the existence of finite modes.
37 I would like to thank a reviewer for Dialogue for many valuable suggestions on this paper.